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“In every scientific adventure, the thing that comes first is vision. That is to say, 
before embarking upon analytic work of any kind we must first single out the set of 
phenomena we wish to investigate and acquire ‘intuitively’ a preliminary notion of 
how they hang together or, in other words of what appear from our standpoint to be 
their fundamental properties. This should be obvious. If it is not, this is only owing to 
the fact that in practise we mostly do not start from a vision of our own but from the 
work of our predecessors or from ideas that float in the public mind. 
-Joseph Schumpeter (History of Economic Analysis)-
v 
Abstract 
The research aimed to study whether the Beijing Consensus, a Chinese development model is 
an alternative development model for Africa. The study used Zimbabwe’s plan to 
collateralise its natural resources mainly minerals under the Angola Model strategy as a test 
case. Zimbabwe’s economic revival is currently ransomed by an unsustainable debt that has 
blocked external financial aid from its traditional donors and the western world.  This is 
against the background that since the 1989, economist John Williamson’s economic and 
policy recommendations known as the Washington Consensus became generally accepted as 
the most effective model by which developing countries could spur growth. This model based 
around ten policy recommendations embracing ideals of free-market capitalism that include 
open trade policies, privatisation and deregulation provided a prescription for development in 
the less developed countries. However, its implementation had mixed results such as multiple 
currency crisis, stagnation and recession during the financial turmoil of the 1990s and the 
most recent and more severe 2007 financial crises that led to the collapse of several nations’ 
economic systems. This further eroded the confidence in the Western neoliberal economic 
model leaving the world calling for an alternative development model. 
By the turn of the century, a new strategy driven by China that has been defined by Joshua 
Cooper Ramo as the Beijing Consensus surfaced as a challenge to the Washington 
Consensus. This model is described as pragmatic, recognises the need for flexibility in 
solving multifarious problems. The model sounding warning bells for a post-Washington 
Consensus is inherently focused on innovation and emphasise equitable development driven 
by the central government has quickly gained appeal within the developing world challenging 
the Washington Consensus’ antiquated policies. 
This exploratory research case study using primarily available literature on the subject sought 
to determine whether the Beijing Consensus is an alternative development model for Africa. 
To help synthesise the subject, Zimbabwe was used as a case study through primarily the 
“Angola model”- a Chinese strategy for resource-rich countries that are unable to guarantee 
loan repayments. Apart from the “Angola model”, the study looked at the overall impact of 
the Chinese investments in Zimbabwe and Africa in general. The findings of the study has 
revealed while the Angola Model may have worked for Angola and other oil producing 
nations, it however will not benefit Zimbabwe as it is not geared in solving the current debt 
crisis. The results also show that while the Beijing Consensus may not actually be a 
consensus, it is currently an alternative for African nations as it presents an array of choices. 
It however does not seem to replace the Washington Consensus as a widely accepted 
consensus model for development but it has the right ingredients from a starting point to 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1. Introduction 
Proposals to address the challenges of poverty and development in Africa has 
ranged from live music concerts organised by rock star Bob Geldof, the G20 
summit, the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) among other 
development agencies all with one thing in common: the eradication of poverty and 
finding sustainable development models  for Africa.  
For the past 60 years Africa has been a recipient of billions of dollars from 
bilateral, multilateral, private donors and other development finance institutions yet 
the share of Africa in global trade has remained insignificant, despite the 
implementation of the of the Washington Consensus-based policies that were 
recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB). Although these economic policies could be said to have improved 
macroeconomic stability in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), they had not facilitated the 
solution to development in Africa and developing countries in general (Sanusi, 
2012).  
On the other hand leaders in developing countries and other developed countries 
marvelled at China’s phenomenal growth in the last three decades. The remarkable 
ability to bounce back after the financial crisis was a result of tightly managed, top-
down policymaking machine that could avoid the delays of a messy democratic 
process. In response, political leaders in the developing world began to associate 
efficiency and capability with autocratic political systems (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 
2011).  
Research studies conducted by Idun-Arkhurst and Laing, (2007; World Bank, 
2007) identified that one of Africa’s biggest challenges is building physical 
infrastructure to support development and to “facilitate the flow of goods and 
services between individuals, firms and governments.”  
The study reckoned that closing Africa’s infrastructure deficit will require some 
substantial levels of sustained finance for infrastructure in the region. Infrastructure 
investment needs for Sub-Saharan have been estimated as at least 5 per cent of the 
2 
 
region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), plus a further 4 per cent of regional GDP 
to cover operational and maintenance translating to US$22 billion per year of 
infrastructure needs, and a further US$17 billion for maintenance  
Africa being richly endowed with natural resources has a historic opportunity to 
harness these resources and invest the proceeds to broaden its economic base for 
supporting economic growth and poverty reduction (World Bank 2007).  Armed 
with its development model better known as the “Beijing Consensus”, China with 
its substantial reserves has not baulked at the massive investment in infrastructure 
required to extract Africa’s last untouched reserves. The entry of competitive 
Chinese construction and telecommunications firms offers Africa cheaper access to 
infrastructure that is essential for economic growth. 
Using this strategy, the Chinese have been building roads, rehabilitating 
infrastructure and bringing in wireless communication systems in rural areas where 
landlines have not worked before bringing hope to the continent that has been 
described as hopeless. This relationship between Africa and China has become the 
subject of much speculation and controversy as to the real intention of China’s 
motives on the continent. 
1.1 Research Problem  
Is this relationship with China beneficial to Africa and does it offer Africa an 
alternative development model? The answer to this question lies in the 
relationship that existed between Africa and its traditional Western donors and 
why Africa has decided to turn its back on the West and look toward Eastward. 
The Washington Consensus of the 1980s bankrolled by the neoliberal ideas led by 
Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain, Ronald Reagan of the United States and 
Helmut Kohl of Germany coincided with the sudden collapse of the Soviet 
system Naim (2000). The three leaders attacked the modern welfare state and 
many of their critiques such as bloating state bureaucracies that resulted in 
inefficiency were well-taken (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011). The disenchantment 
with socialist ideas and central planning pervaded many developing countries 
outside the Soviet bloc, creating an urgent and widespread need for an alternative 
set of ideas on how to organise economic and political life. 
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In a strange way the Washington Consensus became an ill-suited and temporary 
substitute for the all-encompassing ideological frameworks that millions of 
people had come to depend on to shape their opinions about affairs at home and 
abroad. Its appeal was helped by its self-assured tone (“the consensus”), its 
prescriptive orientation, its directional message, and its origin in Washington, the 
capital of the victorious empire. Many developing countries were left with no 
other choice but to fall into the welcoming but stern arms of the Washington 
Consensus (Naim 2000). 
The consequences of that decision was that at the beginning of 1982, the majority 
of developing countries lost substantial leverage over their economic destiny as 
foreign debts incurred during the preceding two decades fell due at a moment of 
historically high interest rates. The US government working with the 
governments of other rich nations pressed developing countries into free market 
paradigm as a condition for new loans. The IMF was assigned the role of 
enforcing the policies; the World Bank urged similar reforms through its 
“structural adjustment” loans (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999).  The dependency on 
aid by most African states and the 1979 oil  crisis meant that when the 
Washington Consensus attempted to impose conditions on African states as part 
of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), African states where in no 
position to protest. 
Rebol (2010) identified that the economic reforms failed to recognise that Africa 
needed some home-grown policies that reflect the situation on the ground, rather 
than ‘one-size fits all’ approach that might have worked elsewhere in the past. 
Reforming countries were discovering that economic growth did not matter much 
to people if hospitals did not have medicines in. Naim (2000) observed that what 
the Washington Consensus was not providing were policies that would enable 
newly opened economies to cope more effectively with the consequences of 
globalisation, especially in the financial sphere. Between 1994 and 1999 alone, 10 
middle-income developing countries experienced major financial crises. These 
“accidents” wrought havoc in the countries financial systems, bankrupted their 
banks, set back some of the economic gains they had accumulated through years 
of painstaking reforms and in some cases unleashed severe political turmoil. 
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In subsequent years, the need for an alternative vision seemed to grow, 
particularly in the wake of financial crises, which apparently laid bare the 
weaknesses of market fundamentalism and highlighted the importance of 
government regulation. 
Eventually at the turn of the 21st century, a new development model driven by 
China emerged challenging the assumptions of aid and development in Africa. 
The emergency of China with its willingness to spend its foreign currency in 
developing African infrastructure has altered the equation. China claims that its 
new re-established friendship with Africa based on the eight principles of Chinese 
foreign aid that is based on equality, mutual benefit and respect for the 
sovereignty of the host nation.  
This “success” of the Chinese development model that has succeeded in moving 
235 million of its citizens out of poverty has brought into question a number of 
fundamentals that had long been condemned by the Western world. This 
pragmatic approach by China that has served it so well over the past decades has 
begged answers on why should any other country adopt the recommendations of 
the Washington Consensus when the Beijing Consensus’ phenomenal success is 
there for the world to witness. Huang, (2010) poses the following questions: If 
state ownership of firms promotes economic growth, why privatise? If one-party 
system works well in generating growth in GDP, why democratise? If state 
financial controls are effective in resource mobilisation, why liberalise? 
Eventually the debate about the Beijing Consensus is about theory – whether it 
has the right economic principles that promote growth.  
1.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
The theoretical framework for this study emerged from the main themes and 
theories that were identified during the literature. These themes helped to define 
the main research question and the subsidiary questions. The conceptual 
framework that emerged from these themes has become the focus of the study.   
The predominant theory about this study is the manner in which China 
transformed itself from a poor, underdeveloped backward country into a modern 
developed country. What has really astounded the world is what really propelled 
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this developmental success. This phenomenal success for a country that declined 
to adopt the framework of the Washington Consensus has attracted the attention 
of Africa with its economic miracle dubbed as the Beijing Consensus.  
Mikheyev (2013) has undoubtedly helped to articulate the theoretical framework 
under which these two diametrically opposed models operate. He states that the 
Beijing Consensus which is presenting itself as a normative power to the 
Washington Consensus is rooted in neo-Confucianism with its emphasis on the 
harmony and communitarianism. According to this model, developing countries 
need a strong state that can pursue a more decisive and purposeful policy of 
economic and political reforms. The central government should pursue a long-
term policy of elimination of illiteracy and poverty through major investments in 
infrastructure and education and foster strategically important sectors of the 
economy. Instead of the trickle-down principle of laissez-faire capitalism, the 
Beijing Consensus favours the more equitable distribution of wealth and a more 
generous welfare system. 
On the other hand the Western neoliberal of civilization and progress is rooted in 
Social Darwinism. Mikheyev (2013) states that the American neoliberal 
capitalism rests on the belief that the state should play a minimal role in the 
economy, that unlimited inequality in wealth and power is natural and good, and 
that prosperity of the “masses” is achieved by the trickle-down effects. 
The fundamental theoretical difference between these two models is hinged on 
the way they approach the development issues. The key dilemma resembles the 
chicken and egg puzzle as it begs the question of what should come first: 
democratisation or economic development. The Anglo-Saxon model presumes 
that democracy should come first and that all means and methods of establishing 
democracy are legitimate. The logic behind this is that once liberty, democracy 
and rule of law are established, the country can pursue economic development. 
This underlines the insistency of democratic political reforms on the continent by 
the West. 
The China model, in contrast, stands for economic and human development first 
and gradual democratisation later. The logic being that: the early introduction of a 
fully-fledged democracy while the population remains illiterate and poor is 
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fraught with social strife and anarchy. Hence economic, institutional and 
institutional development should precede democratisation.      
The question however is not just whether the state is a good owner of productive 
resources: the role of the state is as much broader than this. The question is also 
whether the state should play a more active role in the economy than it was 
assigned in recent years in the West. One need not believe that minimising the 
role of the state was implicit in the Washington Consensus in order to recognise 
that the thrust of policy was to enhance the role of markets (Williamson, 2012). 
Government had long been viewed as the problem and markets as the solution. 
One of the longstanding criticisms of the Washington Consensus and the IMF 
was not just the failure to understand economics but it is argued that they failed to 
take into account adequately politics and political processes, and how they are 
intertwined with economics. 
From the developing countries’ perspective, the experience of China proves that 
the gradual transition produces much better results in terms of economic growth 
and social stability. Africa perceives the China model as an attractive alternative 
to the American hegemonic model of governance and development.  
Ultimately the debate about the developmental challenges the world is facing 
especially Africa and the less-developed countries is centred on the role the 
government should play in the economy. The debate between the Beijing 
Consensus and the Washington Consensus is a debate between the market and the 
state. China’s unprecedented success over the last thirty years has been attributed 
to the role the state has played in the economy. 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of this research is to determine whether the Beijing Consensus 
can benefit Africa as an alternative development model. The research will 
challenge the universal perceived superiority of the Washington Consensus. The 
research will also discuss whether China’s engagement with Africa is a win-win 
one.  In an attempt to answer that question the research will examine the Beijing 
Consensus in the context of the Zimbabwean situation. In the process the study 
will also briefly discuss the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) as a strategy 
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that has been proposed for Zimbabwe alongside the Angola Model The rationale 
for discussing the HIPC in particular for Zimbabwe will enable the comparison 
with the Angola Model.  The dilemma for Zimbabwe is finding a solution that 
can assist in reviving its economy that is seriously handicapped by a debt 
overhang. The Angola Model and the HIPC initiative are strategies that have been 
recommended as important steps for resolving Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. The 
Angola Model has been used in other resource-rich countries and seems to be 
working prompting the debate of whether the same strategy can work for 
Zimbabwe.  Overall the study is about crystalizing the Chinese development 
strategy and applying it to Zimbabwe debt situation to see if it could work. 
1.4 Motivation of Research 
The motivation to pursue this report as stated above emerged from the debate that 
was going on in Zimbabwe on how best it could turn around its economy which is 
being confronted by a debt overhang for over a decade now. As at the end of 
2012, the Zimbabwean’s external debt stock including arrears was estimated at 
US$10.7 billion representing 113% of GDP of which about 70% is in arrears. 
The debt issue which has become a major impediment to rapid economic 
recovery has become a development challenge to Zimbabwe and without its 
resolution there will be no access to development resources from the international 
financial institutions. Its non-resolution has undermined the country’s 
creditworthiness making it impossible for the country to attract any new funding 
from the international financial institutions and the private creditors.  
The divergent views that emanated from the debate prompted the researcher to 
purse the subject further in an effort to understand the Beijing Consensus as an 
alternative development model for resource rich countries such as Zimbabwe that 
unsuccessfully implemented the Washington Consensus-backed reform programs 
could benefit from the Chinese development model. The realisation that resource-
countries like Angola which was in an almost similar position managed to 
wriggle itself out of its debt situation and now enjoying sustainable economic 
growth begged for research.  
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1.5 Significance of the Research 
The Beijing Consensus as a developmental model that can effectively challenge 
the Western-backed Washington Consensus is still being debated. Not much has 
been known as a “consensus” except that China’s phenomenal rise is attributed to 
this model. Its image in Africa is synonymous with counterfeit goods, imitations 
of products made in Europe and America and big famous stadiums built in Africa. 
Along the same lines, the Angola model of resource for infrastructure is also a 
relatively a new phenomenon which has only been in existence in Africa at the 
turn of the 21st century. Its implications and impacts are still being debated by 
scholars, researchers, politicians as well as academic practitioners. The real 
impact and implications will truly be known after a number of studies that span a 
number of years.  
This makes this subject an interesting one to pursue as many researchers and 
analysts have different interpretations of what the consensus embodies thus the 
research is of significance to scholars, policy makers, the research fraternity as 
well as the general public. It seeks to expand the debate on the merits or demerits 
of resource-backed finance deals for Africa’s resource-rich countries. It will seek 
to contribute to the domain of development arena as it analyses the knowledge 
base of development models that are emerging. To scholars, it seeks to explore 
the mechanics of this development model and allow critical analysis of this report 
and identify gaps as well as areas for future research.  
The research attempted t to highlight both the positive and the negatives aspects 
of the model so that the general public are enabled them to make an informed 
decision of China’s investments in Africa. Understanding accurately China’s 
development model has never been as important and relevant. Given the influence 
of China and Beijing Consensus model, it is extremely important for policy 
makers to get the facts right and identify the correct policy lessons about China’s 
growth. 
1.6 Research Questions  
The research questions have been developed from the review of literature. 
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1.6.1 Primary Research Question 
There is an evolving international debate about the benefits and drawbacks for 
Africa on its new strategic partnership with China and questions are being posed 
as to whether Africa’s time has finally arrived. The main research question that 
has emerged from the literature review which this research will attempt to answer 
is: 
• Can the Chinese strategy for Africa be beneficial to Zimbabwe? What 
are the costs and benefits for Zimbabwe? 
1.6.2 Secondary Research Questions 
In order to answer the main question, the broader issues of the China-Africa 
relationship need to be addressed through the following sub-questions: 
1.6.2.1 Is there a Beijing Consensus and how is it different from the 
Western approach to development (Washington Consensus)? 
1.6.2.2 What is the Angola Model and how does it affect the relations 
with Africa? 
 1.7  Structure of the Study 
The study is structured in two main parts. The first part of the study described the 
Beijing Consensus and how it differs from the Washington Consensus and why 
African countries are being attracted to this model. It will then link the Angola 
Model as part of the Beijing Consensus with special focus on Zimbabwe in the 
second part. 
The second part of the study applied the Beijing Consensus in the form of the 
Angola Model in the attempt to resolve the Zimbabwe economic crisis. It also 
discussed the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative as an available 
solution to Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. The costs and benefits of each strategy 
were also being looked at. 
Chapter 1 introduces the study providing the background and context of the 
research. It provides the research problem, the purpose of the research, motivation 
of the research and the objectives of the research as outlined above. The chapter 
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explained why it was worthy studying the case and how it will be of any 
significance in advancing knowledge in the research arena. 
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) expanded and analysed the existing literature on 
the Beijing Consensus and how it has been received on the continent. The 
Literature review focused on the work that has been done by researchers who 
have researched similar questions related to the Beijing and the Washington 
Consensus and what their findings were before comparing them with the findings 
of this research. In particular the literature review discussed the feasibility, the 
costs as well as the benefits to Zimbabwe of adopting the Angola Model in favour 
of the HIPC. It is important to highlight that the Angola Model is being discussed 
in this study as part of the Beijing Consensus development strategy framework. 
Chapter 3 provides the research methodology and research design. The chapter 
discussed the approach to the research in terms of data collection methods, data 
analysis and the validity and integrity of the data.  
Chapter 4 presented the findings, analysis and discussion. The results of the study 
were presented by integrating the findings from the literature review in line with 
the primary and the secondary questions. The chapter also presented the results of 
the Beijing Consensus application in Zimbabwe as well as in Africa in general. 
The implications of the findings were also being presented in this chapter 
alongside the findings. 
Chapter 5 concluded the research summarising the main findings and finally 










Chapter 2:  Literature review 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature so as to locate the research within the wider body 
of knowledge of which it is part of. The literature review was based on an extensive review of 
research papers, articles downloaded from the internet, journal articles and textbooks. This 
enabled the researcher to review work by other researchers who have already done research 
on the Chinese investments in Africa and compare the results.   
The Literature Review begin by examining the origin of China-Africa relationship and what 
motivated Beijing’s foray into the “dark continent,” the reasons why Africa was attracted to 
this development model and whether this model is beneficial to the continent.  Thereafter the 
Review analysed the Chinese developmental model (Beijing Consensus) as to what makes it 
different from the traditional Washington Consensus that Africa and the rest of less-
developed countries have been implementing. The latter part of the review examined the 
mechanics of the Angola Model as a strategy that Beijing has been using for resource-rich 
countries in Africa and how this model can assist Zimbabwe in its search for a solution to its 
economic crisis burdened by an unsustainable debt. 
2.1.1 The Sino-Africa Relationship – A Historical Perspective 
This introductory part of the chapter presented the background of China’s involvement in 
Africa. While China’s initial contact with Africa was 600 years ago in the Ming Dynasty 
when Muslim Admiral Zheng travelled to the East Coast of Africa, the intensification of this 
relationship dates back to the 1950s and 1960s. The reason for this is to set and understand 
the historical linkages that existed between Africa and China and the reasons for China’s 
return to the continent at the turn of the century. The early years of China’s relationship with 
Africa was predominantly influenced by ideology when China committed itself to the 
frontline of struggle against colonialism.   
. When Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited 10 independent African countries in 1963, he laid 
out the eight principles of Chinese foreign aid that would be based on equality, mutual benefit 
and respect for the sovereignty of the host country (Liu, Zhong and Thompson, 2011).  
The turning point for this relationship was after the Bandung Conference in 1955 which 
marked the process when China began to cultivate ties and offer economic, technical and 
military support to African countries and liberation movements in an effort to unite them 
against both super powers (Adisu and Sharkey, 2010). The consolidation of this relationship 
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culminated in the continent helping China regain its seat in the United Nations from Taiwan, 
a victory that Mao Zedong, the leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) described as, 
“carried into the United Nations on the should of African nations.”  
 When Deng Xiaoping became leader of China, he faced two policy challenges with its aid 
policy. First, there was realisation that every turn-key project abroad was a sacrifice of 
China’s own modernisation. Secondly there was realisation that aid projects failed after 
China handed them over to local African governments, signalling a huge waste of China’s 
scares resources hence threatening to slow down China’s own development and 
modernisation. The Chinese authorities responded by claiming that while foreign aid would 
remain a central part of China’s foreign policy, foreign spending would become intensely 
cost-benefited oriented so as to maximise benefits and reduce costs and structured to benefit 
China’s modernisation (Liu, Zhon & Thompson, 2011). The subsequent framework of this 
policy was the creation of three policy banks to manage financial resources overseas: China 
Development Bank (CDB), China Export and Import Bank (Exim) and China Agricultural 
Development Bank (CADB).     
This relationship was further strengthened during the China-Africa Cooperation Forum 
(FOCAC) held in Beijing in 2000 which was attended by 44 African countries and 80 
ministers. This forum is the main state-level mechanism of formal cooperation in China-
Africa relations. FOCAC is a distinctively bilateral arrangement in China’s relations with the 
now 49 African countries that recognise Beijing. The forum which is held every three years is 
principally grounded on the developmentally defined doctrines of a “win-win”, non-
interference, respect for diversity, economic development and sovereignty involved 
cooperation on investment, financial operations, debt relief and cancellation, agricultural, 
natural resources and energy, education and multi-lateral matters (Adisu and Sharkey, 2010;  
AFRODAD, 2010).  
The relationship is also guided by the 2006 China’s African Policy through what is termed as 
the “non-interventionist and non-ideological strategy” which calls for increased trade, more 
aid and more debt relief.  This policy according to Alden (2005) is shaped by four factors 
which are: China’s need for energy security, new market and investment opportunity, 
symbolic diplomacy and development and forging strategic partnerships. 
As it did during the Cold War, China has been seeking to deepen alliances with African 
countries to enhance its global standing and counter Western influence in world bodies like 
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the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China seeks to build solidarity 
with African governments and to present itself as a reliable interlocutor between the 
developing countries and the developed West. Having  managed to reduce poverty from 84% 
in 1981 to 15.9% in 2005, China regards its development model as offering the best blue print 
for Africa’s own economic emergence. It also views its foreign assistance as a way of 
promoting its economic interest and Africa’s development.   
The natural resources sector, principally petroleum and to a lesser extent minerals has been 
the major focus for the Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI). The growth in commercial 
activity between China and Africa has been accompanied by a significant expansion of 
Chinese official economic assistance to the region, which is focused mainly on infrastructure 
and typically channelled through the China-Exim Bank (AFRODAD, 2010). 
The Chinese trade and investment in Africa is driven by the following main actors and their 
motives. 
Table 1:  Main Chinese actors active in Africa 
Main Actors   Main Motive 
The Chinese government tries to implement the government’s strategy 
with respect to Africa and it coordinates the 
activities of different actors 
State-owned enterprises Go to Africa as part of the official Go out 
policy to assure the supply of raw materials 
Private Chinese companies Go to Africa because they see opportunities 
there and fear cut-throat competition in the 
Chinese market 
The Chinese Embassy in  Informs Chinese firms in the country 
concerned and coordinates activities of 
different actors 
the country concerned 
 
Chinese people Have different interests, but are driven by 
strong economic motives to go and work in 
Africa 
 
Adapted from “New Presence in Africa”, 2009 edited by Meine Pieter van Dijk 
 
These main actors drive the Chinese strategy with respect to Africa guided by the 
following eight different objectives: 
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1. Assure the supply of raw materials for China, including agricultural 
products 
2. Create a market for Chinese products and services 
3. Obtain land for agricultural purposes 
4. Channel migration of Chinese people to Africa 
5. Gain diplomatic support from African countries 
6. Present an alternative to the Western development model 
7. Provide an alternative to Western development cooperation 
8. Emphasise China’s status as a superpower 
 
The Chinese profile as a donor has placed infrastructure firmly on the 
development agenda especially in war ravaged and resource-rich countries such 
as the DRC and Angola and Zimbabwe. (Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, AFRODAD, 
2010). This way China has experimented with linking aid to economic 
development with the controversial “Angola Model” – a resource backed 
financing agreement where a recipient nation uses its natural resources or 
commodities to secure low-interest loans for projects. The recipient nation can 
turn resources into cash when funds are short and develop its extractive 
industries. 
The earliest form of China’s development assistance to Africa in the form of 
infrastructure dates back to the TanZaRa (Tanzania Zambia Railway) railway 
project completed and handed over to the Zambian government in 1976. This 
project was taken by the Chinese after the Western world declined to finance it. 
This was intended to provide a transport corridor to African nations that 
circumvented South Africa (Corkin, 2007; AFRODAD, 2010).      
Since then China has increased its economic expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa 
building vital infrastructure, including dams, ports and roads and helping to 
renovate government buildings (Zafar, 2007).       
2.1.2 Overview of the China-Africa Trade 
China-Africa’s trade was a paltry US$12 million in 1950 and it grew to US$100 
million by 1960. This rose to US$29.5 billion in 2004, nearly US$40 billion in 
2005, US$55.5 billion in 2006 and US$73 billion in 2007. By 2011, the China 
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Africa trade reached USD 166 billion (see Figure 1); an indication of the 
strengthened relationship between the two regions with South Africa and Angola 
remaining as China’s largest trading partners. 
Figure 1 
 
This was a new record high and an increase of 31 per cent year on year (The 
China Analyst, 2012). As reported by Zafar (2007) in 2004, real GDP in Sub-
Saharan Africa accelerated to 5.1 per cent, the highest in almost a decade 
underpinned by the strength of the global economy and more by oil and 
commodity prices. This has seen China surpassing the United States as Africa’s 
most important bilateral trading partner. Even with this phenomenal growth trade, 
Africa constitutes only about 10 per cent of China’s global trade. On the other 
hand, more than 10 per cent of Africa’s total trade is with China (Shinn, 2011). 
In terms of trade balances, China had a US$10 billion trade surplus with Africa in 2009 as a 
result of the drop in the price of oil. About 70 per cent of Africa’s exports to China are crude 
oil followed by raw materials (mostly oil) at 15 per cent. About 15 African oil and mineral 
exporting countries have large trade surpluses with China while more than thirty others have 
sizeable trade deficits. For this latter group, China has taken steps such as duty free imports 
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from poorer African countries to rectify the situation (Shinn, 2011). Overall trade between 
China and Africa is led by oil exporting countries such as Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. 
The region has seen a surge in a positive economic environment that has seen the 
region sustaining real GDP of 4 to 6 per cent for quite some time and growing 
above the world average and even faster than Latin America since 2002. This can 
be attributed to the richly endowed countries of the region which now possess 
opportunities to harness their natural and invest the proceeds to broaden its 
economic base for supporting economic growth and poverty reduction. 
In 2011, China’s imports from Africa totalled USD 93.2 billion (see Figure 2), up 
40 per cent year on year with five-biggest African exporters to China (South 
Africa, Angola, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cong-
Brazzaville accounting for nearly 80 per cent of China’s imports. 
  Figure 2 
 
During the same year, China’s exports to Africa totalled USD 73.1 billion, up 20 
per cent year on year with five-leading export destinations for Chinese goods in 
Africa – South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Liberia and Algeria accounting for 54 per 
cent of the continent’s total imports. Between 2001 and 2006, China’s exports 
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relative to the price of imports from China improved by 80-90 per cent as a result 
of rising world prices for oil and raw materials which are Africa’s main exports.  
While China’s presence in Africa is driven by economic self-interest, both Africa 
and its traditional development partners stand to benefit from Sino-Africa 
relations. But it has also raised major policy challenges for African governments 
and international donors as is discussed elsewhere in this report. 
2.1.3 Why Look East? 
The move by African countries towards the east and the reasons forthwith is well-
documented (AFRODAD, 2010; Schmitt, 2007; Rebol, 2010; Alden, Large and 
Oliviera, 2008; Davies, 2010 and Brautigam, 2009) just to name a few but what is 
lacking in the literature is the consensus as to whether this move is in the best 
interest of the continent.  
AFRODAD (2010) established that most African countries who are threatened by 
natural dissent, external pressure to reform, slammed by sanctions find a safe 
refuge in China-Africa relations. For most, the reason is not only concerned with 
getting rid of Western interference in their domestic issues and preserving 
national sovereignty, but to them China seems to be an alternative to the Western 
economic prescriptions marred by aid conditionalities. China’s non-interference 
policy in the governance and human rights issues of these countries seems to be one of 
the more attracting factors than anything else. 
In most parts of Africa where resentment of the West prevails, China is perceived 
by governments as the new ‘economic messiah’, a new investor and a new friend 
in a world where there is growing uneasiness over what African governments 
perceive to be patronising attitudes of the West.  
Kenaan (2009) provides an economic reality that China can provide the much 
needed funds Africa requires for development considering that the Western 
countries have been providing relatively less aid in ways that have been less 
appealing to the recipient countries. For a number of years African leaders have 
chaffed at the broadening range of conditions attached to aid or loans. 
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Kenaan (1990) went further to suggest that some African states have also 
partnered with China for reasons that China’s deals provides more opportunities 
for leaders to enrich themselves than deals with the West. This is so because 
China does not require recipient countries to implement anti-corruption measures.  
Dijk, (2009)’s point is that China has a lot of goodwill in Africa based on the fact 
that China is a developing country itself that also helped Africa in the 1960s and 
1970s and the fact that the Chinese are not lecturing the Africans on how to 
behave and telling them what they should do.  
A World Bank (2007) research on infrastructure in Africa observed that China’s 
approach to financial assistance is different from that of traditional donors, and 
forms part of the broader phenomenon of south-south economic cooperation 
among developing nations. The principle underlying this support is therefore one 
of mutual benefit, reciprocity and complementarities and are grounded in bilateral 
agreements among states. 
Davies, (2010) reckons it is China’s developmental finance approach with its 
higher tolerance of investment risk than traditional funding mechanisms that is 
increasingly appealing to African states over models that may not always cater for 
the developmental needs of resource rich countries but developmentally poor 
African economies. 
This view is further reinforced by Schmitt (2007) and the World Bank (2007) 
stating that in most African countries, the new Chinese engagement is highly 
appreciated, especially at political level. It counters the perceived “post-colonial 
hegemony” of the West and gives additional room for manoeuvre in negotiations 
with donors. China’s support is known to be realised fast – it does not involve 
tedious negotiations with a high number of conditionalities attached. The fresh 
approach to development assistance by China eschews any interference in 
domestic affairs, emphasises partnership and solidarity among developing nations 
and offers an alternative development model based on a more central role of the 
state. 
Idun-Arkhurst and Laing, (2007) state that China forgives the debts of borrowers 
that develop strong political and economic relations with it within an agreed 
timetable. On top of that Chinese development aid helps to finance infrastructure 
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projects, including road and railway rehabilitation, hydropower stations, stadia, 
hospitals and schools. By 2005, Chinese companies had been contracted 722 turn-
key projects across Africa. By mid-2006, total China Exim bank concessional and 
non-concessional loans for infrastructural development in Africa excluding 
projects in the petroleum and mining sectors, were US$12.5 billion. 
The Chinese funded Bui Dam’s Executive Secretary at Ghana’s Secretariat 
Project Mr. G.D. Boateng was bullish about the Chinese presence:  
“With Chinese assistance, old development plans that were jettisoned at the 
instance of development partners are now being revived and are being 
executed at much lower costs.” Before the Chinese came, “the Bui Dam 
project had been on the shelf since the 1960s. We had expressions of 
interest from a number of Western companies in the 1990s and in 2001, but 
they all fell through because those companies didn’t see the project as 
bankable. Now with the Chinese assistance the project has gone off the 
shelf to the ground and this time it is an integrated project that includes the 
building of a new city around Bui and the idea came from the previous 
projects in China  
In support of the above view, in This Day (2005) cited in Adisu and Sharkey 
(2010) reported that the Chinese were not imposing the neo-liberal package of 
reform usually required by the World Bank under its “conditionality provisions”. 
Chinese aid by contrast comes without strings attached and is seen as supporting 
initiatives by African states to address development issues not solved by Western 
investment.    
All these views were reinforced by Brautigam (2009) when she stated that for so 
long Africa has been dubbed the failed continent and the only images of Africa as 
portrayed from abroad is that of a continent characterised by civil wars, hunger, 
corruption, hunger and sex crimes. She correctly pointed out that it would appear 
that anything that would change this perception would be welcome albeit 
whatever cost. 
 China makes no specific political demands, and allows African countries to 
retain complete sovereignty. China’s only demand for entering into commercial 
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relations is a complete break of links with Taiwan (Lafargue, 2005). China, being 
a developing country that has succeeded has created an image that is appealing to 
African countries. 
These sweeping calls for Africa to ‘Look East’ in a new, more optimistic age of 
economic growth and apparent political opportunity had one Kenyan newspaper 
posing the question: With China calling, is it time to say goodbye to the US and 
Europe? That question, according to Alden, Large & Oliviera, (2008) is 
important and will be considered for some time considering that there have been 
growing concerns that China’s relations with Africa replicate and reinforce 
established patterns that are unfavourable to African development. 
2.1.4 So what is the “Beijing Consensus”? 
China’s phenomenal success has given rise to the debate about what the “Beijing 
Consensus” is, its reasons for achievements and the implications for broader 
debates about what constitutes the most appropriate development strategy for 
developing countries generally. This idea of China as a model for prosperity as 
highlighted by Brautigam, (2009), Rebol (2010), Broad & Cavanagh (1999) and 
Williamson (2010) has captured the imagination of many ordinary Africans 
although others fear the threat of competition from the Chinese industrial 
juggernaut. 
 
This debate is centred on what the term could mean, with each school projecting a 
different view. According to Rebol (2010), the US neoconservatives often reduce 
it to economic growth without the constraint of political institutions, others 
emphasise the aspects of liberal trade and finance and yet others point at state 
guided development with concern for stability. In examining what constitutes the 
Beijing Consensus, Rebol (2010) provides an analysis of how this successful 
Chinese development model mean. The term was coined by Goldman Sachs 
China advisor Joshua Cooper Ramo when he in 2004 famously wrote in an article 
that: 
“China is making a path for other nations around the world who are trying 
to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit 
into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly 
independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world 
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with a single massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new centre 
and physics of power and development the Beijing Consensus”. 
The “ Beijing consensus’ is crafted along three principles of innovation, chaos 
management promotion and theory of self-determination against the Washington 
Consensus’ ten rules namely fiscal discipline, tax reform, public expenditure 
priorities, competitive exchange rates, privatisation, trade liberalisation, 
liberalising interest rates, deregulation, liberalising of inward FDI and property 
rights. Ramo (2004: 12) cited in Turin (2010) states that in order to outpace the 
“friction losses of reform,” government must actively innovate in order to address 
the challenges introduced by the changing economic and social environment.  
The theory of self-determination emphasises the need for developing countries to 
actively seek independence from outside pressure that is imposed by 
“hegemonic” powers such as the United States. This is evidenced in the fact that 
China stubbornly refused to submit to outside pressure and instead pursued its 
own priorities. This according to Gresh (2010) cited in Turin (2010) emphasises 
that developing countries can plan their own development without having to 
accept the unfavourable terms of the Washington Consensus. This is particularly 
true for African countries where western countries have had a long history of 
incursion and exploitation, this proposition of self-determination is highly 
appealing.   
In expanding the three principles mentioned above, William (2012) has identified 
five policies that China has pursued. These policies are incremental reform, 
innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, state capitalism and 
authoritarianism. In terms of incremental reform, Williamson (2012) quotes the 
often repeated Deng’s phrase about “grouping for stones to cross the river.” He 
emphasised that it is better to seek modernity by incremental change than through 
committing all on a “big bang” designed in abstract and imposed from the above. 
This certainly fits with the way that China has introduced many reforms first in a 
particular province rather than springing unproven on the whole society at one 




On the subject of innovation and experimentation as a derivative policy, Ramo 
emphasised that there is great value in constant innovation and experimentation.  
China’s rise as an economic power house has been attributed to the way China 
experimented with different models and its innovativeness. The export-led growth 
China has pursued is obviously a product of the SEZs Beijing introduced in the 
early years of its economic and policy reforms.   
While China has never explicitly announced its abandonment of socialism, there 
is no longer any pretence of central planning. Resources are now obtained via the 
thoroughly capitalist means of buying them at market prices. But many 
companies remain state-owned-enterprises (SOE) and maintain an advantage in 
bidding for resources in the so-called free market by virtue of the fact that many 
banks are also state-owned and prefer lending to SOEs. Davies (2010) highlighted 
that the state capitalist approach applied by Beijing is unique in that the 
government is able to make sweeping pronouncements, often on behalf of its 
business sector, to invest and commit capital to Africa. 
A hallmark of Chinese policy in the international arena has been the support of 
national sovereignty irrespective of the content of the decisions implemented or 
the characteristics of the regime power. This cheerleading for democratic ideals 
under the umbrella of national sovereignty especially towards less-developed 
countries has been one of the attractiveness to the China model. At the same time, 
while the ideal may be collective good of the community rather a summation of 
individual well-being, the Chinese leadership accepts that it has responsibilities 
rather than aiming for its own satisfaction. Williamson (2010) believes these 
development policies are the content of the phrase” Beijing Consensus.”  
2.1.5  How does it differ from the Washington Consensus? 
The issue of what makes the Beijing Consensus unique in comparison to the 
Washington Consensus is at the core of this study and has been a subject of 
interest by researchers, academics, scholars, policy-makers and even politicians.  




Table 2: Washington versus Beijing consensus for achieving economic 
development 
Washington consensus versus    Beijing consensus 
In economic terms 
1. Free markets and an important role for 1. Important role for the 
government in the private sector   the economy 
2. Loans, but under strict conditions  2. No conditions for      
       soft loans 
3. Projects: use local companies to create 3. Use Chinese   
employment companies,              
employment and technology 
4. Transfer of technology, knowledge and 4. No transfer of            
experience (capacity building) knowledge and     experience 
In political terms 
1. Democracy    1.  No recognition of Taiwan 
2. Liberalisation    2.  Political support for China in 
3. Limited time for political functions   the United Nations and other           
(2 times five years for example   fora 
 
The Washington Consensus as a phrase was coined by John Williamson in 1989 
in response to the inadequacy of Latin American reforms. He identified areas that 
needed further improvement embodying ten rules namely, fiscal discipline, tax 
reform, re-ordering public expenditure priorities, competitive exchange rate, 
privatisation, trade liberalisation, liberalising interest rates, deregulation, 
liberalising of inward FDI and property rights.     
According to Ramo in Dijk (2009), both the Washington and the Beijing 
Consensus pursue the same goals but in a different order of priority, with Beijing 
giving priority to stability and development while the Washington consensus 
views reforms as a pre-condition for stability and development. While the 
Washington consensus favours privatisation, the Beijing consensus encourages 
the use public money and a push to protect public property.  
Corkin (2007) and Idun-Arkhurst and Laing (2007) in their discussion found out 
that the fundamental difference inherent in China’s overseas development 
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assistance to Africa as compared to Western donors is that Chinese aid comes 
without political or economic preconditions, such as transparency and good 
governance, as insisted upon by most aid organisations and IFIs. Unlike the Paris 
Club of donors and the international financial institutions, China exerts no 
political pressure on African governments for political and economic reforms. 
China is only declared condition as stated above is the recognition of its “one-
China” policy, by which African governments are expected to break off 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan Chinese diplomats repeatedly emphasise that 
this is in order to uphold the “non-interference” principle one of the cornerstones 
of China’s foreign policy.   
 Corkin (2007) emphasised that the apparent Chinese interest in the needs of 
African states, as opposed to the West’s dictatorial approach that told developing 
states what was needed, encouraged a positive view of Chinese donors that 
furthered a belief that the Beijing Consensus had more to offer than the 
Washington Consensus. Another clear message from the Chinese stakeholders is 
that whenever African countries raise concerns, China is willing to adopt those 
changes as opposed to the dogmatic and rigidity approach by the Westerners. 
Another striking feature about China as a donor to Africa is that the former is also 
a developing country, suffering many of the socio-economic challenges as the 
latter. This has arguably informed China’s approach to foreign aid in its rhetorical 
emphasis on a development partnership, as opposed to donor-recipient 
relationship as well as a consciousness of the sensitiveness of sovereignty and 
self-determination, as reflected in the policy of non-interference (Corkin, 2007). 
China’s loans to Africa have more favourable terms and give the African 
governments more ownership over their expenditures. Western aid is more 
prescriptive and makes the fundamental error of bruising a country’s sense of 
sovereignty.  
2.1.6 Is it all a Win-Win Situation? 
One of the most contentious issues in China-Africa relations is how to evaluate 
China’s rapidly expanding role in the continent especially in the area of energy 
and resource extraction. The economic and strategic consequences of China’s 
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increased focus on Africa have been a subject of much debate locally and 
international but it appears less attention has been paid to the likely social 
consequences of China’s increased interest in Africa (Kenaan, 2009).   
The intensification of the economic ties between the two regions has led some to 
question China’s motives. While the China-Africa Policy is understood to be 
based on a win-win situation, not every African is singing a lyrical ballad to the 
Chinese presence. Concerns have been raised as the situation on the ground 
appears to be in favour of the Chinese. One side argues that Africa has never been 
better off than it is now as it now has the opportunity to fulfil its development 
aspirations. On the other side are those who equate China with the Western world 
whose only interest in the continent is to plunder the resources and leave it 
poorer. 
A number of studies (Adisu and Sharkey, 2010; Lafargue, 2005; Jiang, 2009: 
Kenaan, 2009) have formed a good base for further debates and analysis on this 
subject. There is a growing trend to view China’s rapidly evolving presence in 
Africa as a force of good for the continent after its stagnation in the post-
independent decades. Senior Chinese policy makers and diplomats have 
confidently expressed the view that Western colonial powers had their chance to 
deliver development to Africa in the second half of the 20th century but they 
failed miserably. Now its China’s turn to provide an alternative development 
path, one that is primarily based on the Chinese development lessons (Jiang, 
2009). 
Some have described the Sino-Africa partnership that has been marked by 
China’s rising power in geopolitical and economic spheres as a new form of 
colonisation where African countries supply their raw materials to China while 
the latter sends back finished goods to Africa under the paradigm of free trade. 
The alarm bells being sounded emanate from what appears to be China’s 
duplication of the same social and environmentally destructive economic model 
already being followed by the West (AFRODAD, 2010).  
Adisu and Sharkey (2010) and Chatelard (2012) believe the main motive for 
Chinese relationship with Africa is to gain access to the abundant raw materials 
that Africa offers. Chatelard (2012) reports that while some argue that China is a 
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21st Century partner for development and a unique catalyst for growth, critics fear 
that China is a new colonial power, plundering Africa’s natural resources and 
exacerbating existing patterns of corruption and inequality. 
Wang and Bio-Tchane (2008) raises concerns on how China’s growing presence 
might affect Africa’s development. They state that many African nations worry 
about its possible impact on local industries and employment while major 
industrial nations worry about the lack of donor coordination and rebuilding of 
debt burdens in poor countries that have benefitted from their recent debt write-
offs,     
While China’s entry into Africa has been welcomed by a number of African 
countries as a less intrusive source of finance, traditional donors and civil society 
groups argue that it could frustrate efforts to develop international consensus on 
reform, accountability and transparency, and regulate export credit agency 
projects that may slide Africa into a new debt trap and environmental degradation 
(AFRODAD, 2010).  
2.2 The Dilemma for Zimbabwe  
This part of the research attempt to link the Chinese investments in the continent 
with what is taking place in Zimbabwe. When the subject of China in Africa is 
mentioned especially from the international arena, the Zimbabwe and China story 
is inescapable as Zimbabwe believes that China will be able to solve its economic 
challenges as will be debated later in this study. The focus of this part is to 
establish the feasibility of applying the Angola Model to the Zimbabwean 
situation and determine if this strategy can be beneficial to the country. The 
Chinese have applied the model in Angola after which it was named and the 
strategy seems to have helped the Angolans in reviving its economy that had been 
ravaged by a 27 year-old civil war. 
2.2.1 Overview of Zimbabwe’s Crisis 
The Zimbabwean government inherited a US$700 million debt at independence 
in 1980 from the Rhodesian government (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2011), a debt 
which the country wanted to repudiate. The short-term high interest debt placed a 
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huge strain on the resources which were geared towards the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure that was destroyed during the liberation war. 
In order to finance these projects, the government had to borrow from foreign 
governments, private banks and the international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fundamental 
policy differences between the country’s policy makers and the Bretton Woods 
institutions led to the deterioration of the economic situation. By 1987 the debt-
export ratio had spiralled to 35%. However, common ground was struck and the 
two agreed to implement a series of economic reform programmes.  
 In came the period of the SAP which resulted in a ‘gold rush’ for new credit and 
marked a new structure, composition and magnitude of the country’s debt profile. 
The new loans were costly with nearly US$3.5 billion new loans over a period of 
three years. According to the Jubilee Debt Campaign (2011) most of the loans 
were given with little transparency and accountability, driven by the interests of 
the lenders on one end and the political elite rather than the needs of the 
Zimbabwean people on the other end. While these funds from the IMF and World 
Bank came with conditions that were meant to place the country on a sustainable 
growth path, the reform programmes did not produce the desired outcomes. The 
conditions of the loan was that the country had to follow a World Bank Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that included devaluation of the 
currency, restrictions on government spending that included investment in 
infrastructure and wage freeze while the private lender’s debt attracted high 
interest rates which eventually became difficult to repay.  
The economy began to tumble. There was a 14 percent contraction in 
manufacturing output, 5.8 percent decline in per capita GDP. The external debt 
exposure jumped from 175 percent before ESAP to about 250 percent of debt 
stock to exports post ESAP (ZDDI, 2010). Prior to this, the economic growth was 
high averaging 4.5 per cent compared to elsewhere in Africa. The devaluation of 
the currency led the economy shrink by 20 per cent between 1981 and 1990 
leaving the country with relatively fewer resources to pay foreign debt.      
In an effort to slow down the economy from bleeding, a series of negotiated debt 
restructuring arrangements that often included new credit lines were negotiated 
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albeit on more stringent conditions. Failure to service the debt resulted in 
withdrawal and suspension of new credit. This resulted in the isolation of the 
country further constraining its ability to access any future donor funding (ZDDI, 
2010). 
The debt situation was further aggravated by a period of economic ineptness and 
unsustainable borrowing on the domestic markets, disruptive political 
environment and a series of misguided macroeconomic policies that were in some 
instances well intended but poorly implemented (ZDDI, 2010). Between 1986 
and 2007 Zimbabwe has gone through more than five economic blueprints as 
shown on Appendix A. 
Meanwhile the country was witnessing a very deeply entrenched economic crisis, 
the worst in its modern history. According to the World Bank (2013), while 
Zimbabwe was on the path to middle income status in the 1980s and much of the 
1990s, it has since suffered from protracted fragility induced by recurrent cycles 
of political and economic crisis. In the last decade and a half, Zimbabwe reversed 
the social and economic strides it had made since independence. Between 1998 
and 2008, GDP declined by an estimated 96.5 percent and the hyperinflation due 
to poor macroeconomic management that emerged in 2006 caused critical services to 
fail. A large number of skilled workers in both Government and the private sector left 
the country, and commercial farming which had been the backbone of the economy 
collapsed as the government forcefully expropriated land under the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme. 
 The economic crisis peaked in late 2008 when extreme hyperinflation resulted in 
de facto abandonment of the domestic currency. Official year-on-year inflation 
reached 231 million percent in July 2008, although estimates by independent 
economists put the figure at the end of October 2008 at above 2 quintillion 
percent and unemployment at 80 percent. The government filled the gap by 
printing money that further induced spiralling hyper-inflation. According to John 
Hopkins University economist Steve Hanke’s calculation, Zimbabwe’s annual 
inflation was by November 2008 the second highest in history at 79.6 sextillion 
percent, meaning that prices were doubling every 24.7 hours (Richardson, 2013). 
In 2008, 24 new currency denominations were introduced. The IMF had 
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estimated that real GDP in 2008 fell by 14 per cent over and above the 
cumulative decline of 40 per cent between 2000 and 2007 (ZDDI, 2010). The 
same year witnessed real income per head dropped to its lowest since 1960 as 
shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Real Income per head (1963-2013) 
Year       US$ 
1960       390 
1970       515 
1974       580 
1980       500 
1990       537 
1991       552 
2000       535 
2008       280 
2013       370 
Source: World Bank Database 
The Short Term Economic Reform Program (STERP) implemented by the 
inclusive government between 2009 and 2012 witnessed a remarkable recovery of 
the economy as shown by the economic indicators (see Table 4). Policies such as 
cash-based budgeting introduced by the Ministry of Finance ended the 
distortionary quasi-fiscal policies and the dollarization of the economy managed 
to set the appropriate platform towards economic stability (Leo and Moss, 2009). 
These efforts according to Richardson (2013) witnessed Zimbabwe’s GDP 
growth averaging an impressive 7.3 percent making it one of the world’s fastest 
growing countries surpassing Hong Kong, a territory with a stable currency and 
one of the freest economies in the world. 
The Zimbabwe’s economy growth recovery trajectory witnessed the country 
taking off at a growth rate of 6 percent in 2009, 9 percent in 2010, and 9.3 percent 
in 2011 before coming down to 5 percent in 2012. The inflation rate began at -7.7 
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percent in 2009, 3 percent in 2010, 4.9 percent in 2011 and 3.7 percent in 2012 
managing to keep inflation below its target of 5 percent during the period. 
Table 4: Zimbabwe: Economic Indicators  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 Est 2013 Proj 
Real GDP growth (%) 6.0 9.0 9.3 5.0 5.0 
Fiscal overall balance, inc. quasi-
fiscal (% of GDP) 
-2.9 -2.6 -3.1 -10.4 -3.8 
Fiscal primary balance, inc quasi-
fiscal (% of GDP) 
0.5 -0.1 -1.1 -8.4 -1.9 
CPI inflation (%, annual average) -7.7 3.2 4.9 3.7 5.6 
Broad money (M3, % of GDP) * 31.0 28.4 34.4 39.0 38 
Domestic credit (% of  GDP) * 56.5 21.0 29.3 40.1 40 
Private credit/domestic credit (%) 105.4 105.6 101.0 100.8 8.5 
Exports (% of GDP) 27.7 43.1 44.6 47.8 46 
Imports (% of  GDP) 55.1 68.5 63.7 66.3 63 
Current account balance (% of  GDP) -24.4 -21.1 -35.5 -20.1 20 
External debt (% of GDP) 124.0 121.3 111.1 116.3 116 
Official foreign reserves (months of 
imports) * 
1.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Source: World Bank (2013) Interim Strategy Note for Zimbabwe FY 13-15; * IMF 
estimates 
In June 2011 the inclusive announced the launching of another economic 
blueprint expected to chart the way forward for the economy during the medium 
term amid fears that the document, like its predecessors, would be consigned to 
desk-drawers. The Medium Term Plan (MTP), a successor to the Short Term 
Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) was expected to calm the nerves of 
investors would run up to 2015. Unlike previous documents such as the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which according to the 
permanent secretary for Economic Planning and Investment Promotions Dr 
Desire Sibanda, was foisted on to the country, the new plan was home-grown. 
The recovery of the Zimbabwe economy during this period was as a result of off-
budget support from the United States and Europe (see table 5) and a one-time 
hardship grant of US$500 million from the IMF in special drawing rights (SDRs), 
while China was advancing loans. Apart from this, the Zimbabwean government 
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continues to find it difficult to borrow from the outside to pay for its deficit 
spending. 
Table 5: Zimbabwe: Sources of off-budget support, 2011 
Bilateral partners  2011 Projected expenditure Percentage share %
    (US$ millions)  
Australia   50.0    9.31 
Canada   15.0    2.79 
Denmark   18.1    3.37 
European union  5.9    16.00 
Finland   8.2    1.53 
France   TBA    TBA 
Germany   38.9    7.25 
Ireland   6.0    1.12 
Japan   15.8    2.94 
Netherlands   22.2    4.14 
Norway   13.6    2.53 
Sweden   32.3    6.02 
Switzerland   11.8    2.20 
UKAID   85.9    16.00 
 USAID   133.1    24.80 
Total   536.80    100.00 
Source: Richardson (2013) 
Apart from this impressive growth, the Zimbabwean’s external debt stock 
including arrears was at the end of 2012 estimated at US$10.7 billion. 
representing 116% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of which about 70% is in 
arrears. The bulk of the debt is owed to the bilateral creditors amounting to 
US$3.3 billion or 31% of the debt, followed by multilateral creditors at US$2.8 
billion or 26% of the debt, other debt at US$2.5 billion or 23% of the debt and 





   
 
Figure 3        
 
  Source: Author’s own calculations from UNDP Brown Bag Dialogue Series 
After a long spell of neglected infrastructure, the recovery of the Zimbabwean economy 
hinges on rehabilitation as well as new infrastructure to drive the economy to a sustainable 
growth path. It is estimated that the country needs about US$15 billion for the next three 
years to cover the resource gap and US$45 billion for the next 10 years for it to recover to the 
1997 GDP levels. 
Strategic policy response discussions and debates to the debt overhang have been 
going on amid a number of options.  The country’s prominent economist and 
University of Zimbabwe (UZ) Business School Head Antony Hawkins consider 
that Zimbabwe must declare itself for HIPC debt relief mechanism. He has been 
emphatic about what he considers to be the only solution when he said, “We will, 
however, have to bite the bullet sooner rather than later. But our politicians say 
we are not poor because we are rich with lots of mineral wealth such as 































The country is currently facing a severe liquidity crunch which is causing the 
country fail to get liquidity both locally and international due to the debt 
overhang and bad credit rating. The situation is worsened by a balance of 
payment account which currently does not appear to be stabilising as the country 
continues to import more than it is exporting as shown on table 6. 
Table 6: Zimbabwe: Balance of Payments (US$ m unless otherwise stated) 
       Est.           Projected 
       2009       2010          2011 2012            2013         2014 
Current account   -1.339        -1.913    -3.249           -2.262      -2.373        -2.201
      Trade balance                  -1.600       -1.844     -3.066          -2.656           -2.673        -2.492 
Exports (f.o.b)    1.613         3.317      4.496            4.054       4.189          4.515           
 Imports (f.o.b)   -3.213       -5.162    -7.562           -6.710      -6.862        -7.007 
Nominal GDP     6.133         7.433      8.865            9.802           10.978       12.280 
                            Current acc bal (% of GDP)   -21.8         -25.7      -36.7              -23.1            -21.6          -17.9 
        Usable int. reserves           312          197         182                  143               171           270 
  Months of imports/exports       1.0           0.4          0.3                   0.2               0.3             0.4 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Author’s compilation from IMF (SMP) Zimbabwe Country Report: 13/29 (2013) 
 
Zimbabwe urgently needs lines of credit to enable it to reopen industries and 
boost capacity. The once opened lines of credit are getting dry including the once 
promising support from China as Zimbabwe defaulted on a 2003 Chinese 
US$200 million advanced to procure farming equipment. The Chinese are now 
reluctant to offer more funds without any collateral to which Zimbabwe has 
considered obtaining more loans pledging its natural resources as collateral. 
Zimbabwe has failed to attract foreign investment, especially from the Western 
world who demand more political reforms and are also anxious about the 
indigenous law that requires that 51 percent of firms worth over $500 000 should 
be owned by black Zimbabweans. 
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As reported in the Financial Mail, Hawkins (2013) maintained that the 
Zimbabwean government does not seem to embrace the idea of debt relief route 
seeking to go it alone – backed as expected by its all-weather friend China and 
other friendly nations. However, the go-it alone option is increasingly getting 
unattractive, not least because, having borrowed offshore since and with an 
accumulated arrears of US$7 billion, foreign lenders are not exactly queuing up 
to make loans. Even with China, after having defaulted on a US$200 million loan 
advanced to procure farming equipment, the taps are drying. Similarly, with the 
indigenisation law restricting foreign investors to 49 percent of the equity, 
inflows of FDI have been disappointingly low.    
“This debt issue according to Andrew Bvumbe, head of the Zimbabwe Aid Debt 
and Management Office (ZADMO) is a development challenge to Zimbabwe and 
without its resolution there shall be no access to development resources from the 
international financial institutions,” The former Finance Minister, Tendayi Biti 
concurred that the non-resolution of the debt issue has become a major 
impediment to Zimbabwe’s rapid economic recovery undermining the country’s 
creditworthiness making it impossible for the country to attract any new funding 
from the IFIs and the private creditors. The consequence of the debt overhang has 
caused adverse effects in an effort to steer the economy on a sustainable recovery 
growth path.  
Bravely enough, some government officials speak of ‘leveraging’ the country’s 
mineral reserves by mortgaging to offshore lenders at very high interest rates to 
repay the debt, but this is an expensive, not to say unnecessary option when given 
political flexibility on Zimbabwe’s part, donors would be prepared to sign a debt 
forgiveness deal (Hawkings, 2013).   
In view of the above scenario, Zimbabwe has decided to collateralise its natural 
resources for lines of credit along the Angola Model. The strategy is premised on 
the undertaking that the country is endowed with vast amounts of natural 
resources that it can utilise (ZDDI, 2010). Will according to the Zimbabwean 
President, Robert Mugabe “turning to the East where the sun rises and giving our 





2.2.2 Zimbabwe-China Relationship 
The relationship between Zimbabwe and China is driven by the Look East Policy 
adopted in the early 2000s at a time when the relations with Western countries 
turned sour due to the country’s failure to service its debt. International isolation 
and a bad credit record left Zimbabwe desperate for a shoulder to lean on 
(Machadu, 2012).  The policy adopted in 2003 sought to expand bilateral and trade 
relations between the two countries.  The general decline in Zimbabwe’s socio-economic 
structures forced the country to approach the East Asian block in particular China for 
salvation.  As a result of the Look East Policy thousands of Chinese nationals have 
‘invested’ in the country (Radiovop, 2012). While the Look East Policy was 
never ratified in the legislature, it has nevertheless remained the guiding policy 
for engagement with the Asian tigers as emphasised by the Zimbabwean 
President Robert Gabriel Mugabe when he said, 
“Let us not forget that the material assistance that helped us liberate this 
country came from China It is very important to develop the Look East 
Policy because that is where people who think like us are, same history of 
colonialism as ourselves (and) people who have started developing their 
economies,”  
The motives for Zimbabwe adopting the policy have been varied and 
controversial as scholars proffered diverse reasons. According to Chingono 
(2010), it is difficult to ascertain if Zimbabwe would have adopted the Look 
East Policy had sanctions not been imposed on the country judging from what 
one government minister was quoted saying, 
“And now that we are in the situation where the West has abandoned us, 
and they want to see Zimbabwe go under, go down the drain, our 
leadership, our government, our party decided that we go back to our old 
time friends, our all-weather friends and those friends are the Chinese.” 
Beijing’s relations with Zimbabwe include diplomatic support, economic and 
trade deals and close military ties. For a country tagged as a pariah state, China 
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remains its only major international supporter and a patron for its neo-
communist land reform policies and resource exploitation (Eisenman, 2013). 
According to Miller (2012) China has become increasingly central to the Look 
East policy. In the first nine months of 2011 alone, Sino-Zimbabwean trade 
increased 62 per cent, totalling US$171 million. However, the trade is tilted in 
favour of China, a price to pay for desperation. According to Machadu (2012), 
the Zimbabwe 2010 exports to China were valued at $237 million, while 
imports were $557 million, a trade deficit of $ 320 million. During the period 
2006-2010, exports to China grew in value by an average 31 percent per annum 
and imports by some 32 percent. The top exports are unmanufactured tobacco, 
ferro-chromium, chromium ores and concentrates, cotton, edible nuts, nickel 
sulphates and granite – all unprocessed commodities. Zimbabwe in turn imports 
all finished goods ranging from cheap clothing, electrical apparatus, exercise 
books, bicycles, generators and engines.    
China has also made investments in a host of industries including 
telecommunications, construction and most importantly mining. China supplies 
Zimbabwe with expertise, technical assistance, and agricultural equipment that 
include tractors and agro-processing. The Chinese state –owned firm, China 
International Water and Electric, has been contracted to farm 250 000 acres in 
southern Zimbabwe. Chinese and Zimbabwe developers believe the project will 
yield 2.1 million tons of maize every year, and require the building of massive 
irrigation system (Eisenman, 2005).  
The interest of China in Zimbabwe as in any other African country has raised a 
number of questions. One of the questions that have been raised elsewhere is 
whether China is indeed a loyal friend and a business partner. While the answer 
to this question is a mixed bag as will be shown elsewhere in this report, China 
is important to Zimbabwe for a number of reasons.  
First as a member of the Security Council with veto power, China demonstrated 
its true friendship with Zimbabwe when the country was threatened with further 
sanctions after the United Nations condemned “Operation Clean-up” or 
“Murambatsvina” in Zimbabwe’s vernacular language saw hundreds of Harare 
residents left homeless and also after the 2008 disputed elections. It has been 
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argued in some circles that the main aim of the so-called clean-up was to make 
way for the Chinese informal traders as most of the displaced citizens were 
engaged in informal trade which has ironically become an off-shoot of the 
Chinese presence in the country.  On both occasions China with the help of the 
Soviet Union vetoed the resolution.  
Secondly the meteoric rise of China as an economic power house is an 
important factor for Zimbabwe. China has become one of the largest trading 
country in the world and is poised to replace the United States as the largest 
economy in the world as early as 2020.  China has not only become the 
manufacturing factory of the world, but it has returned to the centre of the 
world. So no country would afford to ignore the soon to be the largest economy 
in the world, Zimbabwe included. 
The Chinese have managed to secure contracts to develop Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural, mineral and hydroelectric resources. The Look East Policy 
provides Beijing with opportunities to unearth Zimbabwe’s valuable natural 
resource which the country is unable to do due to its vast poverty and 
estrangement from the West thereby securing lucrative deals for Chinese state-
owned firms. Zimbabwe has the second largest deposits of platinum in the 
world, estimated at over $500 billion, but due to resource limitations that wealth 
remains untapped. All in all Zimbabwe has over 40 minerals that include the 
ferrochrome, gold, silver, copper and the controversial diamonds.  
The trade relations is also underpinned by the Joint Committee on China-
Zimbabwe Economy and Trade which plays a role in bolstering personal ties 
among elites and underscores’ Beijing’s commitment to Harare. 
2.2.3 The Angola Model for Zimbabwe 
The vision of growing the Zimbabwean economy to US$100 billion in 40 years 
is only attainable if the economy could grow at a compound rate of 10 percent 
per year for 40 years. Achieving such a feat for a country that contracted by 




For a country endowed with massive natural resources and in need of 
infrastructure to support economic growth but lack the resources to unearth it, 
Zimbabwe has turned to China for support. China’s grand plan for resource-rich 
countries like Zimbabwe is through the Angola model – a resource-backed 
strategy modelled along the Angolan experience whereby low-interest loans are 
secured with commodities as collateral in a barter agreement. This has become 
China’s preferred structure of concessional loans to Africa (Corkin, 2007).  
The origin of this model is not clear as there have been different versions of 
where and when it started.  The World Bank (2007) and Brautigam (2009) 
present different versions of its origin of the Angola Model. The World Bank 
(2007) believes the model began in the Congo with the Congo River (Imboulou) 
as the first resource for infrastructure deal in Africa as shown on Appendix C. 
However, Brautigam (2009) link the resource for infrastructure deal to the 
period when in 1958 Japan granted India a three year concessional loan to 
develop an iron ore mining in exchange for 10 million tons of iron ore annually 
for ten years. Years later in 1978, Japan repeated the resource-backed 
concessional loan with China for financing a US$10 billion plant, industrial 
technology and materials in exchange for crude oil and coal supplied by China.  
No independent verification of the two versions has been done as it is beyond 
the scope of this research It appears that China decided to pursue this line of 
investment with Africa starting with The Republic of Congo and Sudan in 2001. 
Both projects were paid for using oil as shown in Appendix C. 
The organisation of this model is relatively complex owing to the need to 
coordinate with two Chinese firms involved, each of which must carry out its 
own due diligence. The arrangement allows countries with abundant resources 
but limited creditworthiness to package the exploitation of natural resources 
with the development of infrastructure assets.   
As soon as a decision has been made to pursue the resource for infrastructure 
deal, project proposals which are identified as priorities by the host country are 
put forward to a joint committee comprising the debtor country’s Ministry of 
Finance and the Chinese Ministry for Foreign and Commercial Affairs 
(MOFCOM). For each project under consideration, the Chinese government 
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proposes three to four Chinese companies to undertake the project. All the 
projects are inspected by third parties not funded by the credit line. A multi-
sector technical group oversees the implementation of projects financed by the 
Exim-Bank credit line, ensuring fast and efficient completion of the project. 
Essentially the debtor country represented by its Finance Minister will negotiate 
a loan, which is at least 20 million RMBY (US$2.4 million). The loan interest 
rate and grace period are separately negotiated with repayment due bi-annually, 
following loan negotiation. The loans must be used for infrastructure, social or 
industrial projects (Corkin, 2007). 
Under this arrangement, the money is never directly transferred to the 
government as shown in figure 4. Instead a framework agreement is signed with 
the government outlining the infrastructure investments. The project 
construction is contracted to a Chinese construction firm. Where the deal 
involves oil as what happened in Angola, a petroleum company is awarded 
rights to begin production. The government of the beneficiary country instructs 
the Chinese contractor to undertake infrastructure works, supported by a credit 
from China Exim Bank. Repayment is in the form of oil, minerals or other 
commodities produced directly by the Chinese company (World Bank, 2007). 
The loan operates like a current account. With instruction from the Ministry of 
Finance, disbursements are then made by the Exim-Bank directly into the 
accounts of the contractors. The repayment starts as soon as the project is 
finished. If a project is not undertaken, no repayment is done. The revenue from 
the oil and/or the commodities sold under this arrangement is deposited into an 
escrow account from which the exact amount toward servicing the debt is then 
deducted. The difference can be used by the debtor government at its discretion 







 Figure 4: Structure of “Angola Model” arrangement 
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                   priority infrastructure projects             
 
       Source: World Bank (2007) 
 
While there have been resource-backed loan deals before, the China Exim Bank’s 
first such major deal was concluded with Angola’s Ministry of Finance in March 
2004 when the first USD 2 billion financing package was agreed to. This financed 
the construction of Angolan infrastructure in the areas of energy, water, health, 
education, fisheries, roads, railways and airport public works projects. This was 
as a result of Angola’s difficulties in securing capital from western-aligned 
international financial institutions, such as the Paris Club and the IMF due to their 
concerns over financial governance of the oil revenues and political 
accountability.  
The World Bank (2007) reports that since the landmark oil-backed deal with 
Angola in 2004, the mechanism has become more popular and the resources used 
to back deals have diversified to include bauxite, chromium, iron ore and even 
cocoa as shown in Appendix B. This was confirmed by Davies (2010) when he 












apparently developmentally ineffective aid disbursements from traditional actors, 
are starting to incline toward China’s concessional finance model deals. 
An example of the barter system involving a non-oil commodity is evident in 
Gabon where the Gabonese government awarded the China National Machinery 
Equipment Import and Export Company (CEMEC) the sole rights to exploit the 
iron deposits in the Belinga region in September 2006. This project represented a 
substantial investment, estimated to bring in approximately 30 percent of Gabon’s 
current GDP at a value of US$3.5 billion. In return, CEMEC committed to 
constructing a special purpose deep-water port at Santa Clara, a railway track 
running 560 km from Belinga to the coast and a hydro-electric power plant to 
facilitate the energy required for the operations. It is a long-term project, intended 
to endure for 15-20 years, and involve, not only the extraction of iron ore but the 
development of auxiliary products. This deal followed the ‘Angola Model’ 
closely as the iron ore reserves was to be used as collateral, and Gabon would use 
it to pay for the substantial infrastructural investment (Corkin, 2007). 
Another development along the ‘Angola Model’ was the US$5 billion loan China 
Exim Bank announced with the DRC in September 2007. US$3 billion of this 
package was to be directed towards a 3200 km railway link between Sakania in 
resource rich Katanga Province, near the Zambian border, to Matadi. Part of the 
financing was also to fund a road link of 3500 km linking Kisangani, north-east 
of Lubumbashi. The balance of US$2 billion was to be used to revitalise DRC’s 
mining sectors. It was announced that the DRC would repay this loan through 
tolls to be imposed along the newly constructed roads once they were finished, 
but also more importantly, through mining concessions. The arrangement thus 
mirrored closely those negotiated in Angola and Gabon, whereby infrastructure is 
paid for by the fruits of these countries’ extractive industries (Corkin, 2007). 
As stated in this report, Zimbabwe has decided to collateralise its natural 
resources for new lines of credit along the Angola model. As expected, not 
everyone is in agreement with the strategy as the commodities-for-infrastructure 
concessional finance deals and the financing model employed is under a great 
deal of scrutiny and suspicion by domestic and external stakeholders. 
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 Since the beginning of the century, Zimbabwe has increasingly become 
dependent on the Chinese foreign direct investments at the back of the “look east” 
policy. The motive for China’s investments in Africa is well documented, but 
what is not well understood is whether this is the best solution for Zimbabwe’s 
socio-economic challenges. Zimbabwe and China entered into a US$5 billion 
deal involving the mortgaging of the Zimbabwe’s platinum resources, that have 
an estimated worth of US$40 billion. This controversial deal was signed between 
the former finance minister, Tendayi Biti and the China Exim Bank.  
While getting accurate figures for Chinese financials deals of this nature and 
investments in Africa in general is difficult, sources close to this deal said that the 
facility benefits China far more than Zimbabwe. In the deal China would get a 50 
per cent stake in the US$40 billion concession in return for US$5 billion loan to 
the country. China would make a US$15 billion profit, which translate to 300 per 
cent from a mere US$5 billion. Reuters (2011) report that in exchange China 
would help Zimbabwe’s economic revival wrecked by what many see as 
mismanagement. Apart from mortgaging the platinum resources, the stringent 
conditions include ceding Chiadzwa (state) diamond revenues and tollgate fees.  
  
2.2.4 Costs of the Beijing Consensus model to Zimbabwe  
The resurgence of the global economic landscape from the financial crisis can 
undoubtedly be credited to China which played a critical role as a key driver of 
economic growth at a time when the western economic markets were subdued.  
Zimbabwe’s recovery after a decade in the doldrums has also largely been 
attributed to China. When the Western-backed sanctions began to bite, China 
stepped in and helped turn around the economy benefitting from this partnership 
through development of agriculture, infrastructure and FDI. 
 As collateralised loans continue pouring in, a number of concerns have been 
raised as to the consequences of the financial deals entered between the two 
countries.  As Muresan (2013) put it, what Zimbabwean leaders ignore is that 
they accept this interest from China now, but how much will they have to pay for 
it in the future? Fortunately or unfortunately, Zimbabweans do not have to wait 
long enough for that question to be answered. 
43 
 
The Zimbabwean industrial body, the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries 
(CZI) has already castigated Anjin Investments, a Chinese mining company 
exploiting diamonds in the eastern part of the country of doing a disservice to the 
country by failing to buy local products as well as recruiting Chinese citizens 
instead of Zimbabweans in their mines (Matimaire, 2013). 
The vice president of CZI Henry Nemaire addressing a Transparency 
International Zimbabwe seminar said there was a need to ask the minister of 
mines to demand a local procurement graph from Anjin showing how much they 
were buying from Zimbabwe. The CZI suggested that if Anjin were buying from 
outside Zimbabwe then they were sponsoring foreign banks and if they were 
buying outside commodities then they were sending money to foreign banks. 
This utterance by the CZI is testimony that most people especially key industrial 
personnel and policy makers are aware of the nature of the Chinese deals 
especially those that attached to resources.  In addition to employing Chinese 
personnel, one of the conditions of resources deal is that not less 50 percent of 
procurement should be sourced from China. 
Muresan (2012) submitted that while the Chinese economic power house may be 
polite to its close business partners, it should be realised that China like all other 
states will work to suit its own style of expansion. While Chinese foreign 
economic interests have long been criticised for being brutal and self-serving, it is 
possible that the Chinese are taking full advantage of Zimbabwe’s pariah status. 
The sentiments of the Zimbabwean community towards the Chinese assistance 
was echoed by the former prime minster in the inclusive government, Morgan 
Tsvangirai when he reminded the Zimbabwean government that the Chinese are 
not altruistic in their business intentions, as they “are not missionaries, they have 
their own business interests, they have their own national interests especially 
when it comes to resources” (Muresan, 2013). 
The introduction of the controversial economic indigenisation and empowerment 
law has dented investor confidence causing some companies to relocate or halting 
some expansionary projects leaving Chinese companies to fill the gap. It might 
seem that China may have been given guarantees that investments from the Asian 
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growing economy would be protected from expropriation under the 
indigenisation and empowerment laws. As a result Chinese companies now 
command a significant presence in mining, retail, manufacturing, construction 
and other sectors of the economy where they have become the new employers in 
town where workers employed by Chinese companies complain of ill-treatment 
and poor remuneration. There is no labour law practised in Chinese-run projects. 
For example, in Zambia, the Chinese have been accused of employing people on 
short-term contracts and in some cases workers were being forced to sign forms 
before going underground to declare that they are working at their own risk so 
that there would be no compensation in case of an accident (AFRODAD, 2010).  
Thirty years of reform has transformed China into a cut-throat, competitive 
capitalist market economy featuring severe exploitation of workers, especially 
migrant workers with sustained low wages. It is thus difficult to imagine that 
Chinese entrepreneurs and companies used to such domestic conditions would go 
to Africa and treat workers there any differently. 
Local businesses in Zimbabwe have been threatened by the aggressiveness of 
Chinese companies which is unparalleled to Zimbabwean capabilities that has 
often seen small indigenous business owners relinquishing their businesses to 
Chinese developers. Chinese companies have been entering the property sector 
pushing rentals of office and other rentals up. This has caused China to become a 
major importer of goods and products ranging from sanitary ware, detergents, 
electrical goods and appliances, power generators, telecommunication equipment. 
Concerns have been expressed over the durability and poor quality of the 
products, prompting debate over China’s genuine interest in its investment into 
Zimbabwe. There is a general feeling that China is a neo-colonial power bent on 
exploiting African natural resources, dumping cheap manufactured goods onto 
African markets and leaving little of value behind. 
 
Machadu (2012) observed that generally the trade between Zimbabwe and China 
is skewed in favour of China as it creates a trade deficit. Zimbabweans seem to do 
very well as they get to consume products without producing them and money for 
capital investment without having to save. In turn, the Chinese get to process 
those raw materials into products they don’t consume, but sell them for a fortune 
45 
 
to the world. The Chinese’ capital investments, technology, skills and money to 
Zimbabwe are not earmarked for processing commodities, but to expedite the 
extraction of commodities at low cost leaving many to wonder where the benefit 
is.  It is known very well that commodity exports do not result in sustained 
economic growth as they are vulnerable to international prices which are beyond 
our control. China is not doing enough, if anything to promote value addition in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
It is arguable whether the relationship becomes what the Chinese described as a 
‘win-win’ relationship is not entirely dependent on China, rather on whether 
Zimbabwe has the institutional and bureaucratic capacity to turn Chinese funds 
and investment to benefit the country. There are reasonable doubts about the 
possibility of widespread and long-term economic benefits to Zimbabwe 
(Karumbidza, 2006). Could the failure of this strategy suggest that Zimbabwe 
declare itself as an HIPC candidate?  
2.2.5 HIPC – a Substitute? 
One of the proposed policy strategies that have been proposed for the 
Zimbabwean debt problem is applying for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative 
framework as a solution to its staggering US$10.7 billion debt. The World Bank 
and other creditors suspended its lending program in 2000 at the time when the 
country went into arrears on loan repayments. Since then the World Bank’s role 
has been limited to technical assistance and analytical work (Leo & Moss, 2009).   
The re-engagement of Zimbabwe with the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and the private creditors will require the arrears clearance. Currently 
Zimbabwe does not qualify under the HIPC Initiative and Zimbabwe has not been 
grandfathered for eligibility since it was classified as an IDA-blend country. If 
Zimbabwe is to declare as an HIPC candidate, the World Bank and IMF Board of 
Directors will need to formally decide to re-open HIPC eligibility for Zimbabwe 
(Leo & Moss, 2009) a process that is likely to take a very long time. The WB 
country director for Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, Kundavhi Kadiresan 
admitted that while Zimbabwe is not on the HIPC country list, it could qualify 
depending on the outcome of discussions with the WB (Nyakazeya, 2011).   
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For Zimbabwe, the idea of paying its debt is a noble one, but its problem is that it 
is cash strapped and is not willing to declare itself as an HIPC so that its debt can 
be forgiven as this comes with conditions. Instead it intends to implement a 
hybrid option under the cabinet approved Zimbabwe Accelerated Arrears 
Clearance, Debt and Development Strategy (ZAADDS) (Gono, 2012). The 
policies enunciated in ZAADDS are at variance with the HIPC initiatives as it 
leverages on the country’s natural resources for sustainable economic 
development. Under this the country intends to take the best parts of the HIPC 
initiative and using revenue from the diamond sales to pay off the debt. However, 
for the creditors which run the HIPC scheme, there is at the moment no option for 
a country to choose which bits it wants to take part in (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 
2011). The creditors require a wholesome implementation of the HIPC process.   
 
The eligibility requirement under the HIPC Initiative is that the country has to 
meet certain criteria.  First Zimbabwe has to be classified as an “IDA-only” 
country. This means that the country is not eligible to receive market-based loans 
from the IBRD. On the other hand, the country must only be eligible to receive 
loans from the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and not 
from the IMF’s General Resource Account (GRA). 
The country must face an unsustainable debt burden which fortunately is the case. 
Added to this is that only the external debt incurred by end-2004 is eligible for 
HIPC Initiative and debt relief. Meanwhile the country has agreed to an IMF staff 
monitored programme (SMP) as a step towards a future Fund supporting 
programme. The SMP is an important step on the road towards normalisation of 
the country’s relationship with its creditors and could help in mobilisation of 
valuable donor-support for the arrears clearance strategy. The country must also 
begin to establish a track record of reform. The SMP will play a crucial role in re-
engaging with the international community and donors and helping in 
establishing a track record of corporation with the IMF on policies and payments 
that can signal to creditors and donors the country’s commitment to a credible 
and sound policy framework (IMF, 2013). 
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According to the former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, “this 
initiative (HIPC) is a breakthrough …. It deals with debt in a comprehensive way 
to give countries the possibility of exiting from unsustainable debt. It is very good 
for the poor of the world” Arslanalp and Henry (2006). 
However this strategy has been met with mixed views from the government, 
academics, civil society organisations (CSO) and the public deeply divided over 
the way forward with some government officials determined to block the move 
on the grounds that the process would “open floodgates to foreign interference in 














Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Design   
3.1 Research Methodology 
This thesis is an exploratory qualitative case study with the purpose of 
understanding the Chinese development model now commonly referred to as the 
Beijing Consensus and extracting evidence on the mechanics of the resource for 
infrastructure model – the Angola Model. Yin’s (1994a: 92) defines a case study 
as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident. It relies on multiple sources of evidence with data 
having the need to converge in a triangulating manner.  
Qualitative research serves the following purposes: 
• Description – to reveal the nature of certain situations, settings, 
processes, relationships, systems within the context of the Chinese 
engagement with Africa. 
• Interpretation – allows the research to gain either insights or to develop 
new concepts or theoretical phenomenon and to discover problems or 
challenges within the phenomenon of the modalities of the ‘Angolan 
Model’. 
• Verification – allows the researcher to test the validity of assumptions 
made within the real world. 
• Evaluation – provides a means through which the effectiveness of 
policies or practises can be judged. The Angola Model will be evaluated 
on its effects on the citizens of the host country.  
The case study methodology has been chosen because of its suitability in 
exploring new phenomenon (Yin, 1994). And its ability to compare the various 
experiences of Chinese investments in Africa and perhaps, depending on the 
findings allows generalizability of the findings.  The method is flexible as once 
the researcher identifies a topic will be able to define the boundaries. Instead of a 
controlled environment, a case study probes events that occur in natural settings. . 
For this study, the researcher chose Zimbabwe as a test case and generally the 
African experience with China with examples of a few countries that were 
relevant to test the phenomenon to assist in the analysis of findings. The 
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researcher selected examples from those countries where China has been deeply 
involved in natural resources extraction.   
The use of case study methodology provides tools for researchers to study 
complex phenomenon within their context.  According to Yin (1994) a case 
should be considered when among other things you want to cover contextual 
conditions because one believes it’s relevant to the phenomenon under study and 
the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.  
The case study will focus from the period of 2000 after the China-Africa Forum 
on Co-operation in 2000. The boundary is there to indicate what will and what 
will not be studied in the scope of the research method (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
According to Baxter and Jack (2008), one of the common pitfalls associated with 
case study is that there is a tendency for researchers to attempt to answer a 
question that is too broad or a topic that has too many objectives. Cognisant of 
this fact, the study will take a single case study approach which will allow 
analysis within each setting and across settings. As the intention is to determine, 
if new found resource-rich countries like Zimbabwe can adopt the Angola model, 
the experience of other countries will be examined to understand the similarities 
and differences between cases and consider generalizability. 
This approach according to Yin (2003) can be used to either predict similar 
results or predict contracting results and whether the findings can be generalised. 
Generalizability refers to the degree to which research findings are applicable to 
other populations or samples. It involves the usefulness of one set of findings in 
explaining other similar situations. A degree of generalizability can be achieved 
by ensuring that the research report is sufficiently detailed for the reader to be 
able to judge whether or not the findings apply in similar settings. The evidence 
produced from this type of study is generally considered to be robust and reliable 
but can be time-consuming. 
3.2 Data Collection Methodology 
The main method for conducting the exploratory research will be based mainly on 
literature review. An extensive literature review will be conducted using the 
internet with material being sourced from journals, e-books, journals, articles and 
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publications with a view to find usable and relevant material for the research. All 
the data will be critically reviewed and only the material that is relevant was used. 
Additional material will also be sourced to substantiate the analysis and findings. 
A hall mark of case study research is the use of multiple data source, a strategy 
which also enhances data credibility (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The use of multiple 
data sources enables readers to assess the validity or credibility of the research. 
The data credibility is achieved through the strategy of triangulation. The 
triangulation of data sources supports the principle in case study research that the 
phenomenon be viewed and explored from multiple perspectives 
3.3  Data Analysis 
 The process of data analysis in a case study does not usually take a lineal 
progression as data analysis usually takes place at the same time at the point data 
collection. This then often results in analytical statements being criticised as 
being descriptive rather than critical. In an attempt to overcome this problem the 
report has been structured in a manner that separates the main literature review 
and the analysis through a separate analysis and discussion section. The intention 
was to highlight only under the literature the main themes and then expand these 
themes under the analysis section. Barritt (1986) cites the primary task of data 
analysis as being the identification of common themes. The process of data 
analysis will enable the researcher to relate the qualitative analysis findings to the 
central themes that have emerged from the literature.  
The data analysis according to Kumar (2011) will involve the following steps 
• Organisation of the details about the case arranged in a logical order.  
• The categorisation of data or themes into meaningful groups  
• Interpretation of single instances or themes with specific occurrences 
examined for specific meanings. 
• Identification of patterns and interpretations scrutinised for underlying 
themes and other patterns that characterise the case more broadly 
• Synthesis and generalisations: drawing conclusions that may have 
implications beyond the specific case.  
There are a number of reasons for adopting an inductive approach, one of which 
when the researcher seeks to generate a direction for further walk. In this 
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instance, it is the intention of the researcher that further research can be 
conducted from the findings of this report. 
3.4 Validity and Reliability 
Kumar (2011), states that the broad sense of validity refers to the ability of a 
research instrument to demonstrate that it is finding out what it was designed to 
and reliability refers to consistency in its finding when used repeatedly. In 
qualitative research, where answers to research questions are explored through 
multiple methods and procedures which are both flexible and evolving, these 
concepts are difficult to apply. Attempts to establish validity and reliability in 
qualitative research according to Guba and Lincoln as edited by Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994) are based on two sets of criteria of trustworthiness and 
authenticity. This criterion is determined by four paralled indicators of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
3.4.1  Credibility 
One of the weaknesses of using a qualitative study approach is that results could 
be influenced by personal bias. In order to avoid this, the research will attempt to 
include triangulation in as far as the behaviour of Chinese presence in other 
countries with a view of verifying the results.  Since the research will explore 
perceptions and myths of the Chinese investments, the credibility (validity) will 
be tested by the convergence or divergence of the findings.   
2.4.2  Transferability 
The transferability or external validity refers to the degree to which the results of 
the research can be generalised or transferred to other contexts (Saunders, et al, 
2009; Kumar, 2011).  It is generally difficult to establish generalizability of the 
findings primarily because of the approach of unstructured and unstandardized 
procedures that is generally taken in qualitative research. An attempt will be 
made to generalise the findings in terms of similarities and differences of 
particular countries selected in the case study. 
3.4.3.  Confirmability 
Confirmability which is similar to reliability in quantitative research which refers 
to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others 
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will be possible in this research. It tests whether similar outcomes would be found 
if the same methodology was used. There is a sizeable quantity of literature on 
the subject of China’s investments in Africa. An evaluation and analysis of this 
literature will be conducted to confirm or reject findings on the subject. It is 
expected that the findings of the research will be reliable enough to make an 
appropriate conclusion. 
3.5 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
The themes that will emerge from the literature review will make the conceptual 
framework of the research. These themes and theories will highlight agreements 
and disagreements and identifying unanswered questions or gaps. The success of 
the Chinese model of investment in Africa has puzzled many people. The 
conceptual framework will describe those aspects selected from the theoretical 
framework which then becomes the basis of my inquiry.  
3.6 Limitations of Case Study Methodology 
The nature of this study being a case study means that sampling is biased hence 
the research will use purposeful and judgemental sampling. The researcher has 
deliberately chosen Zimbabwe as a case because of its peculiarity and more-so 
because it embraces the different characteristics found in many African countries. 
The non-random sampling of the case can be construed as non-representative, a 
development that can affect the outcome of the study. 
Since the techniques for data collection in case studies range from observations, 
interviews, documents records, questionnaire, this study is unfortunately based on 
documents search. The nature of the study would have naturally required 
interviewing a range of key personnel involved with the Chinese mode of 
development.  The absence of such interview data may affect the outcome of the 
study as regards some readers’ expectations.  While having a variety of data 
collection methods could have been an advantage, the use of secondary data 
would not in a way affect the research’s expected outcome. The researcher 
attempted to use the publicly available data to establish whether the Beijing 
Consensus is what Africa need to solve its developmental challenges.     
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Chapter 4: Research Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
4.2. Findings 
The research study’s main objective was to determine if the Beijing Consensus is 
an alternative to Africa’s development challenges with particular focus on 
Zimbabwe. The findings to this question were analysed from three angles which 
are: is the Beijing Consensus an alternative, is there a consensus and what impact 
does it have on Africa’s development challenges. The findings showed what both 
Africa and China stand to gain from this engagement. For Zimbabwe, the findings 
showed that the Angola model is not the answer to Zimbabwe’s economic 
situation. 
 
4.1.1 Is the Angola Model or the HIPC the Solution for Zimbabwe? 
The overall objective of this study was to determine whether the Chinese model 
of development referred in this study as the Beijing Consensus is suitable for 
Africa and in particular helping Zimbabwe solve its economic challenges 
characterised by an unsustainable debt. The Chinese model in resource-rich 
countries, the Angola Model has been the test case for Zimbabwe  
Since the Chinese investment criteria in Africa is guided by a China-Africa 
framework, the general approach in each and every country especially the 
resource-rich countries is similar. But what differs from each country is the nature 
of concessions especially from the debtor country. In view of this and the fact that 
case study methodology is not scientific, the findings of the study showed that it 
is not possible to generalise the findings of Zimbabwe’s experience elsewhere on 
the continent as it was not possible to generalise the Angolan experience to the 
Zimbabwean situation. 
4.1.1.1 The Angola Model  
The Angola Model has become the preferred solution for resource-rich countries 
that cannot provide financial guarantees and Zimbabwe fits in this category.  
While the strategy may have worked for Angola, the same cannot be said for 
Zimbabwe as the funds from China are not directly transferred to a host country 
as they are indirectly linked to infrastructural development. This way, Zimbabwe 
cannot use the loan from China to pay off its debt towards the international 
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financial institutions and other creditors. The model can only pay off loans from 
China. Angola was able to use any revenue over and above the daily agreed oil 
barrels to pay off its debt to their creditors.   
The implication of this strategy is the effect it might have on the already 
staggering Zimbabwean debt due to the complexity of determining stable prices 
for debt repayment. As a result of the dramatic drop in commodity prices 
following the onset of the financial crisis, the question over sustainability of the 
sovereign-backed debt arises. This has come to fore in the case of China’s Exim 
Bank’s deal with the DRC (Davies, 2010; Jaen, n.d). The DRC just like 
Zimbabwe is heavily indebted with USD11 billion external debts but has entered 
into a resource for infrastructure deal with China worth US$11 billion, the same 
value as its debt. The DRC currently has interim status in the HIPC programme 
and for it to qualify it has to start a new three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF). According to the IMF, while the financial deal with China has 
the potential to strengthen the country’s prospects for growth; it is likely to 
hamper the DRC’s chances of reaching the HIPC completion point to alleviate 
sustainably the debt burden. The pressure exerted by the IMF has caused the 
restructuring of the deal to USD 6 million with no government guarantee. 
Zimbabwe’s current deals may also scupper the current negotiations over its debt 
resolution.  
The resource-backed deals that Zimbabwe and China have entered into are 
skewed in favour of China. This could be attributed to the absence of negotiating 
skills. Zimbabwe either does not seem to be well equipped in negotiating deals of 
this magnitude or it could be an act of desperation. This however does not make 
mortgaging resources futile but the issue is about delivering an appropriate policy 
sequence that resonates with economic circumstances.  
 The unfortunate aspect of the model is that by mortgaging the country’s natural 
resource for debts incurred by the current generation at the expense of future 
generations is in violation of the intergeneration equity principle. This seems to 
be what has happened to Zimbabwe with the US$ 5 billion platinum deal.  
While the strategy allows these countries to improve their infrastructure, the 
experience for Zimbabwe paints a gloomy picture. Zimbabwe’s infrastructure is 
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still dilapidated. The state of roads is in terrible state as they are frequently being 
blamed for high accidents. There is frequent power shortage resulting in loss of 
industrial production. The water and sanitation situation is terrible and is likely to 
cause another cholera epidemic.   
The presence of China in Zimbabwe has not benefited the long-term sustenance 
of the economy apart from the availability of affordable cheap products, clothing 
and textiles. The impact of these products has seen the closure of textile and 
retails shops throwing hundreds of workers in the street. The Chinese mining 
ventures has seen the displacement of villagers making way for mines without 
adequate compensation; exploitation of workers by disregarding labour laws; 
environmental degradation caused by the mining activities. The overall impact is 
that the Chinese are taking over the key retail business sectors reserved for the 
indigenous businesses by use of financial muscles. 
4.1.1.2 The HIPC 
While the HIPC debt relief option could have been the preferred solution for 
Zimbabwe because of impact the debt is having on the revival of the economy, it 
has been found that the strategy could have major repercussions on the 
sustainability of debt in the long term.  The argument has been that it simply 
provides a temporary relief summed up as “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” The 
findings of the study showed that if Zimbabwe opts for HIPC debt relief, this 
could open new lines of credit. The disadvantage is that it might have to get new 
loans to pay off old debts thereby increasing its debt and making it more 
unsustainable. On the other hand, the non-resolution of the debt will prevent any 
new borrowings. 
 A study by Stanford Business School (Rigoglioso, 2003) found that debt relief is 
not beneficial to most of Sub-Saharan African countries Zimbabwe included as 
they lack the necessary social infrastructure that can facilitate economic growth. 
The findings of the Stanford Business School seem to give credence to the 
Chinese preferred approach to Africa’s development challenges. China’s focus in 
Africa is targeted on infrastructural development. The “Beijing Consensus” view 
is that the central government should pursue a long-term policy of elimination of 
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illiteracy and poverty through major investments in infrastructure and education 
and foster strategically important sectors of the economy.  
 
4.1.2. Is Beijing Consensus an alternative to Africa’s development challenges? 
The general feeling among the African leaders and some researchers is that the 
Beijing Consensus is an alternative development model to the Washington 
Consensus and could not have come at a better time. Its emergency as an 
alternative source of funding has been particularly welcome, considering the 
paucity of options available to the African governments and the urgency with 
which such funds are required.  
However some analysts have concluded that while engagement may have brought 
some relief to African countries that in itself does not make it an alternative 
model as will be shown in the analysis and discussion section of this report. 
As to the issue of consensus, it is important to note that Beijing has never 
officially proclaimed its development model as a consensus. However, there has 
been overwhelming consensus from the developing world especially African 
countries that the Beijing Consensus is not only an alternative but a better 
alternative.  China’s status as a developing country has become one of the key 
attractiveness in partnering with Africa under the umbrella of the “South-South” 
cooperation.  
In terms of development, this research study has not gone as far as determining 
the statistical impact of Chinese investments on the development index of the 
African states, but what this research has been able to report on is the magnitude 
of infrastructural projects undertaken by China in Africa. 
China’s investments in infrastructural developments have been welcomed by 
African states as it has helped in the recent improvement in the economic growth 
of the continent. In support of this, the former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye 
Wade writing in the Financial Times said  
“China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and 
sometimes patronising post-colonial approach of European investors, 
donor organisations and non-government organisations. With direct aid, 
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credit lines and reasonable contracts China has helped African nations 
build infrastructure projects in less time – bridges, roads, schools, 
hospitals, dams, legislative buildings, stadiums and airports. I have found 
that a contract that would take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign with 
the WB takes three months when we have dealt with Chinese 
authorities…… But when bureaucracy and senseless, red tape impede our 
ability to act and when poverty persist while international functionaries 
drag their feet – African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter 
solutions” (Strange et al, 2013). 
However Chinese’s infrastructural developments especially those in transport and 
energy seem to be driven their interest in facilitating resource extraction. 
 
4.1.2.1 Is China-Africa Relationship a “Win-Win” one? 
Aligned to the issue of whether the Beijing Consensus is an alternative is the 
questions whether the relationship between the two parties is a win-win one. The 
finding of this research has shown that the relationship between China and Africa 
is a symbiotic one – well suited partners. The continent is cash hungry, 
infrastructure deficient and resource rich while China is flush with cash, seeks 
investment for its burgeoning private sector and requires massive natural 
resources to feed its economy. 
4.1.2.2 So What Does Africa Gain?  
The rapid growth of China and its investments in Africa in recent years has 
generated great impact on Africa’s development (Wenping, 2013). In spite of the 
skewedness of the deals, Africa has also much to gain from this burgeoning 
relationship. Africa’s expectations from this relationship are centred at six core 
interests. 
First Africa desperately needs infrastructural development. Finding the US$20 
billion to finance this desperately needed infrastructure has not been an easy task 
making China’s desire to invest in African infrastructure a welcome opportunity.   
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Secondly, China foreign direct investment in Africa has helped the continent to 
record sustainable economic growth. Statistics has shown that between 2002 and 
2009, Africa’s average annual FDI was about US$24 billion.   
Thirdly the continent has gained from the more favourable loan terms offered by 
Chinese banks for a continent that lack good credit rating.   
Fourthly, while the West has helped Africa with debt relief under the HIPC and 
MDRI umbrella, China has also cancelled debt of more than 31 African countries 
estimated at 3.83 billion. 
Fifth, trade between Africa and China increased from US$18.5 billion in 2002 to 
US$108 billion by 2008 making China the second largest trading partner after the 
United States. This has helped Africa sustain high economic growth with 2007 
having registered Africa’s highest growth rate at 5.8 percent. 
Sixth, Africa’s quest for technology transfer and training has found China’s 
willingness in this area as a welcome gesture. This has seen China building 
factories to process raw materials and training more than 20 000 professionals 
between 2010 and 2012 (Haroz, 2011). 
4.1.2.3 And what doe Africa lose? 
While many African countries are inspired by China’s fast modernisation process 
and hope they can bring such prosperity to their own land there are also negative 
elements of China’s development paradigm in the past three decades that could be 
harmful to local development once they are exported to Africa especially in the 
area in the of energy and resource extractive operations. 
Firstly there is fear that while China’s financing even on concessional terms has 
the potential of triggering an African debt crisis. 
Secondly the cheap Chinese exports and migrant labour have put strain on the 
weight of foreign competition. It is reported that in 2008 Africa imported more 
than US$50 billion (Haroz, 2011) worth of Chinese goods, the majority of which 
could have been produced by African firms.  
Thirdly there is danger that Africa risks relinquishing its natural resource wealth 
without any leverage that can offset risks. While in need of foreign direct 
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investment, African countries are engaged in a relentless race to the bottom to 
attract the largest FDI projects. In the process, this competition has led countries 
to offer more than generous incentives to woo the Chinese making the most 
sacrificial concessions  
4.1.2.4 And what does China Gain from this Relationship? 
The findings seem to suggest that China has much to gain from its relationship 
with Africa. First China’s appetite for resources has seen it becoming the world’s 
largest consumer of energy with one third of that now coming from Africa. 
Armed with the Angola model, China manages to structure favourable oil deals 
by locking in agreed daily oil barrels. As China’s economy expands, Africa has 
become the ideal partner in that expansion.   
Secondly Chinese companies facing stiff competition at home needs new 
investment and markets abroad and Africa’s untapped consumer market has 
become a new investment opportunity for its cheap consumer goods. This has 
seen the transformation of SOEs facilitating their entry into Africa. With 
infrastructural requirement of up to US$20 billion, these Chinese firms financed 
by the China Exim Bank, have managed to lock in on contracts tied to the firms 
providing machinery and employment to its citizens.   
Finally the Chinese has used its One China policy campaign to gain diplomatic 
recognition. The shift by African countries owing their allegiance to China has 
demonstrated that the lot is best placed with emergent superpower (Haroz, 2011).   
4.1.2.5 And what has China to lose? 
Although China faces some certain level of risk in its engagement with Africa, it 
nevertheless is in the driving seat. As an emerging global superpower, boasting a 
strong economy with the world’s largest foreign reserves, the risks China faces is 
relatively minimal. But as in any business transaction, there are bound to be costs 
to any transaction and China’s presence in Africa has borne its costs as well. 
Corruption and mismanagement that has been prevalent in Africa has been 
embraced by China as merely an added cost of doing business on the continent. 
The more China does business with Africa, the more it is exposed to these 
hazards.   
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Finally China faces a significant cultural barrier despite Chinese feelings of 
kinship towards Africa. While from an economic front, both parties speak the 
same language, there are very few cultural, linguistic or spiritual areas of 
commonality on which to base their emergent partnership other than being 
subjects of colonialism. The barrage of criticism arising out of China’s presence 
has been blamed on the failure by Chinese in understanding the culture of doing 
business in Africa and equally likewise, failure by Africa to understand the 
Chinese way of doing business.     
 
4.2 Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
This section analysed and discussed the findings of the study. The analysis and 
discussion began with Zimbabwe and the Angola Model and the costs of this 
strategy. The latter part of the analysis discussed whether the Beijing is indeed an 
alternative to the Washington and its costs for Africa in general.  
4.2.1 The Angola Model and the HIPC as solutions for Zimbabwe. 
The success of the Chinese foray in Africa has been attributed to the Chinese 
model of development that put the state at the forefront of everything. For a 
country that snubbed the Washington Consensus and managed to sustain positive 
economic growth for over three decades, China feels it has the moral authority to 
provide an alternative. On the other hand, the Washington Consensus which 
believes that the markets should have a pronounced role at the expense of the 
state still believes its model is still the best options for less developed countries.  
For countries like Zimbabwe that went through the experience of the Washington 
Consensus, the message from China appears to be more appealing. The current 
macroeconomic environment of Zimbabwe demands decisive leadership for it to 
extricate itself from further economic meltdown. For Zimbabwe this is not the 
time to let the market forces determine the direction of the country, but to provide 
framework for the market forces to deliver. But until that happens, Zimbabwe has 
an immediate challenge to solve – its staggering debt and how to solve it but 
unfortunately for this, does not need the markets forces to solve. 
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In determining whether the “Angola Model” is the appropriate solution for 
Zimbabwe’s economic challenges, the Zimbabwe Diaspora Development 
Interface (ZDDI) (2010) analysed the nature of the Angola model as far as it was 
implemented in Angola by comparing it in the Zimbabwean context. While the 
comparison was done with statistics of 2006 when the Zimbabwean economy was 
still in the doldrums, the fundamental principles guiding the comparison have not 
changed much. 
• Firstly, the Angolan deal’s repayment at the time of implementation was 
based on oil flows and was benefitting from high oil prices and high export 
volumes. Angola utilised future oil revenues to secure long-term Chinese 
loans and fixed a price into the future to service the debt. Zimbabwe does not 
have oil and finding value for underground mineral resources has always 
proved difficult.  
• Secondly, while Angola’s debt was not unsustainable with outstanding and 
penalty interest of only US$1.5 billion, the Zimbabwe’s debt situation is 
unsustainable at US$10.7 billion. The Angolan deal structure allowed it to 
utilise any revenue over and above the 10,000 barrels of oil to settle off other 
debts. Thirdly, the Angolan economy was riding on a healthy economy with 
real growth reaching 18.6 percent in 2006 while the Zimbabwe’s economy is 
showing signs of slowing down. This is against the continued isolation of 
Zimbabwe by the IFIs and an economic climate characterised by policy 
inconsistency in attracting investments. 
The ZDDI (2010) emphasised that Zimbabwe will find it difficult to emulate the 
Angolan experience for two reasons: First Zimbabwe does not have the natural 
resource flows but has resource reserves and the amount of these reserves and 
future prices are uncertain. Secondly, no reputable creditors are willing to extend 
credit to Zimbabwe given its repayment track record. Testimony of the second 
reason is corroborated by China’s loans to Zimbabwe between 2002 and 2006 
when Zimbabwe’s loans were on substantially harder than those of other 
countries as shown on Table… 
Before Zimbabweans start celebrating its earth’s bounty, they need to be 
reminded of the consequences of its natural resources, and how that may be more 
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of an economic curse than a blessing. Theoretically, having natural resources 
could produce great wealth for the country, but history is littered with tales of 
missed opportunities as most of the countries were unable to use the wealth to 
boost their economies.  
On a broader level, Zimbabwe has found itself trapped in the paradox of the 
plenty commonly known as the resource curse or the “Dutch disease”. This refers 
to the paradox that countries and regions with an abundance of natural resources 
especially non-renewable resources like minerals and fuels tend to have less 
economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer 
resources. The relationship between China and Zimbabwe as any other resource-
rich country has brought into question the relationship between wealth, the 
conditions associated with wealth and the behaviour of the state. Kennan (2009) 
argues that the Chinese investment in Africa amounts to unconditioned wealth 
and that these investments may reduce rather than enhance social welfare. There 
is a well develop economic literature that suggest that rapid influxes of wealth 
from natural resources can have a profound effect on the domestic economy of a 
state. 
Economists argue that resource-rich countries especially oil do far less to help the 
poor than do countries without resources. While Zimbabwe does not have oil, the 
analogy is no different.  As Karl (2006) put it, the resource curse is a 
political/institutional and not an economic problem, what Zimbabwe need is a 
fiscal social. A contract that is based on transparency – one that creates incentives 
to change the rent seeking behaviour of all actors, both international and domestic 
involved in the natural resources game.  
Similarly, the former Minister of Finance in the just ended inclusive government, 
Tendayi Biti described the move to securitise the natural resources as immoral. 
The immoral aspect of this according to Biti is that “what is underground, to be 
used by future generations as well is now being squandered by the present 
generation.” According to Biti, as reported by Machadu (2013) securitisation can 
on paper work as it has been tried in Angola and Sudan with hydrocarbons, which 
are more easily quantifiable and price discovery is easier. For countries without 
oil, it has hardly been tried and has not worked. The truth is any other resources is 
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extremely difficult to quantify and to give a monetary value can on paper work as 
it has been tried in Angola and Sudan with hydrocarbons, which are more easily 
quantifiable and price discovery is easier. How does one quantify gold or 
platinum that is still underground especially as in Zimbabwe’s case where there 
has been not been any geological survey. Placing value on underground resources 
is extremely difficult especially in the context of the present sphere of price 
volatility. 
Tendayi Biti’s argument seems to be supported by the nature of the deals 
reflected on Appendix B. Interestingly the first four (Republic of Congo (2001), 
Sudan (2001), Angola (2004) and Nigeria (2005) financed infrastructure projects 
backed by natural resources as shown on this table were backed on oil, suggesting 
that oil-backed infrastructure projects are easily quantifiable as opposed to the 
deals for Guinea (2006), Gabon (2006) and Zimbabwe (2006). An analysis of the 
status these deals showed that the agreements were either pending or under 
reconsideration. The  reason being that either the mode of payment which in these 
case were minerals could not be easily quantifiable as shown by unavailable 
financing figures or the certainty of stable commodity prices could not be 
guaranteed as explained below. 
It therefore suggests as reported by the World Bank (2007) that the financial 
terms of the “Angola Mode” are particularly difficult to pinpoint, given that they 
depend to a significant extent on the implicit price agreed upon for the 
commodity traded, and its relation to current and future market prices, so that any 
discount provided with respect to the future prices of oil effectively contributes to 
a hardening of lending terms (or vice versa). Using the Angola mode method of 
finance, China is able to gain physical security over oil resources, normally at a 
slightly discounted price. 
 Although the detailed terms of these Chinese oil-backed loans are not known, 
according to oil specialists at the World Bank the wider experience with deals of 
this kind suggests that they do not typically entail fixing the price of oil over the 
term of the loan. In fact, as oil prices rise and fall over the period, the term of the 
loan is usually adjusted accordingly; for example, a shortening of the repayment 
period as the price of oil rises. In this sense, credit deals tied to repayment in oil 
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are not really a hedge against the future price of oil, but rather provide a way of 
securing a steady supply into the medium term. There is risk that, since servicing 
of these loans depends on sustained global market prices for the collateralised 
commodities;-African countries have become vulnerable to price shocks, natural 
disasters, poor harvest and other variables beyond their control.   
Negotiating deals of this magnitude requires a great deal of skill and expertise 
which currently Zimbabwe does not seem to possess. This absence of capacity in 
government due to the brain drain may result in Zimbabwe being exploited by 
potential investors (if any apart from China) as found in platinum deal. Biti 
believes that under the current environment, securitisation is literally selling the 
country (Machadu, 2013 
The Jubilee Debt Campaign (2011) agrees with the ZDDI (2010) in that using 
mineral resources on debt repayments would be a waste; perpetuating the de-
development cycle where wealth earned from mineral exports is taken out of the 
country by local elites and multi-national companies. The argument is that using 
revenue from minerals such as diamonds to repay debt risks locking Zimbabwe 
into a resource-cursed future and shuts the door on a genuine alternative source of 
investment. 
The benefits of this option to the country were also doubted by the former Deputy 
Prime Minister in the inclusive government, Arthur Mutambara who accused 
Chinese diamond miners who are currently exploiting the Marange Diamond 
fields of ripping off the country. Mutambara said that the dream of a $100 billion 
economy by 2030 will only be a pipe dream if what is happening in the mining 
sector is allowed to continue. (Mangudhla, 2012) reported that the Chinese 
companies are raising money to start mining our resources based on our claims 
we cannot even put value on. He was quoted claiming that the country was being 
savaged by the miners in signing foolish claims that are worth billions of dollars; 
“I don’t know how much minerals under the ground are worth, but I am 
sure they are not worth nothing. They come here (the Chinese) to mine our 
resources after investing only $30 million and they will pay off their 
investments in just two sales,” 
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As reported elsewhere in this report, contrary to the claim that the infrastructure 
proposal derive from the host country, evidence seem to suggest that most of the 
infrastructure benefits the Chinese most. Corkin (2007) establishes that the 
development of transport infrastructure assist with a wider market distribution of 
Chinese imported goods. Heavy investment by Chinese companies in the 
telecommunications infrastructure in countries as Angola and Uganda, oil 
pipelines from southern Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, electric power 
lines, massive irrigation and hydroelectric power systems, along with 
procurement, supply and distribution networks across the continent can be 
expected to have a significant impact in reducing the cost of producing and 
transporting products. The Chinese investment in road and railway systems such 
as the Benguela, Tanzara and Belinga railways is of strategic importance in 
providing Chinese products market access. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, it would appear that resource collateralisation as a 
home-grown solution is unlikely to address the debt challenge. The agreement do 
not appear to provide an immediate integrated approach that can be pursued 
relentlessly to manage external debt as it does not take cognisant of the country’s 
economic capacity and immediate credit constraints ZDDI (2010) 
4.2.2 Costs of Zimbabwe’s engagement with China 
While the idea for Zimbabwe going East-wards seemed to be a wise decision at 
the time as it was calculated to compensate for the withdrawal of the Western 
support, serious reservations are beginning to emerge about the behaviour of the 
Chinese investors in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean of all walks of life from analysts, 
politicians and the “man” in the street have now come to terms of the 
consequences of the Look East Policy. 
In a similar development, the Chinese have been accused of displacing the locals 
who for years had survived on panning gold and diamonds (known as 
chikorokoza in vernacular Shona language) for survival. The introduction of a 
new fee structure that was too high prohibited local people from regularising their 
mining activities giving way to Chinese who use heavy equipment that can even 
divert rivers and causing environmental degradation. A local Member of 
Parliament for Maramba-Pfungwe, one of the areas operated by the Chinese 
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wanted to know if they (Chinese) were licensed, paying anything to the ministry 
of mines or remitting anything to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) 
(Mushava, 2012).  
On the other hand the Chinese companies operating in Zimbabwe have been 
accused (Radiovop, 2012) of not paying taxes. One of the senior Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority officers (ZIMRA) Chief Investigation Officer Siyathemba 
Muremba acknowledged that they have a challenge in collecting taxes from some 
Chinese companies operating in the country. 
“There (sic) are also our friends from the East who are investing in this 
country – but if you ask for tax, their Ambassadors of say, China will come 
to our offices saying you are harassing our people and its unfortunate,” he 
was quoted saying”.      
The Zimbabwe economic model crafted along the Chinese model and relying on 
Chinese FDI seems to be working for now, but this model is simply not 
sustainable. The growth of China is increasingly being threatened by a number of 
factors such as its decline in working age population, somewhat attributed to its 
“one-child” policy meaning that this economic bubble may be starting to burst. 
The implication is that once the Chinese start scaling down its outward FDI 
flows, Zimbabwe would be exposed economically as it would be susceptible to 
external shocks presented by a downturn in China’s economy. 
With the nascent signs of a slowdown in China becoming evident, African 
countries Zimbabwe included that have been riding on China’s craving for 
resources ought to rethink their economic growth models. As is expected, China’s 
economic growth is also slowing down from its historic average of 9 percent to 
7.5 percent 
As reported by Chipendo (2012) muted commodity demand is the inevitable 
consequence of this slowdown leaving countries like Zimbabwe needing to 
rebalance their economies. With two external demand shocks affecting China in 
the last three years, the Chinese is now anxiously looking at a growth model 




While China will not stop importing commodities in the short to medium term, 
developments at home indicate signs of a waning appetite for commodities, a sign 
for mineral resource-based countries such as Zimbabwe to start planning ways of 
diversifying their economies in the next twenty years. As reported by the New 
York Times in May 2011, “The timing for when China’s growth model will run 
out of steam is probably the most critical question facing the world economy 
4.2.3 HIPC as an option 
The dilemma for Zimbabwe is that HIPC or not it still has to clear its arrears so 
that it can be accepted back into the financial circles. And the only way is to go 
through the IMF which gives the stamp of approval for re-engagement with the 
IFIs and private creditors. In support of this strategy, Gideon Gono, the Governor 
of the Zimbabwean Reserve Bank emphasised that the IMF is not an enemy of 
Zimbabwe but a major stakeholder in reviving the country’s ailing economy 
(Chiripasi, 2013). 
The argument for those in favour of the HIPC is that by entering the HIPC, 
Zimbabwe would be eligible for new loans from the IMF, World Bank, African 
Development Bank, including other bilateral and creditors. 
An economist Blessing Sakupwanaya is of the view that there is merit in 
Zimbabwe adopting the HIPC as it could provide a window to access funding 
required for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country’s dilapidated 
infrastructure. The step can be considered as part of the initial process towards a 
long road to restoration of sustainable economic growth (Nyakazeya, 2011. 
The initiative provides an opportunity for the country to re-channel the funds 
initially earmarked for debt repayment into capacity enhancing investments that 
will serve as poverty reduction programmes. According to Farai Dyirakumunda 
an economist, the reality of the HIPC initiative is more of a Faustian bargain, in 
which future debt  relief comes at a price of complying with several years of IMF 
and World Bank programmes with a patchy record of success in Africa 
(Nyakazeya, 2011). However, the experience Zimbabweans went through during 
the ESAP era is not one they would want to endure again. 
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The argument for those against HIPC is that new loans would threaten the 
country to repeat the same mistakes in the past. Most of the new loans would be 
used to pay off the old debt leaving inadequate funds for investment in productive 
sectors. The new loans on top of the old debts have the potential of exposing the 
country to another catastrophic debt burden especially in the adventure of an 
economic shock. 
Debt relief campaigners such as Jubilee Debt Campaign (2009; 2011) on the other 
hand do not believe Zimbabwe should take the HIPC route. They believe that this 
will essentially increase the detrimental effects on the economy by creating 
simply more debt through new ones which are supposed to help pay for old ones.   
The idea of putting new loans on top of the old debts which have not been 
cancelled would potentially leave Zimbabwe with another catastrophic debt 
burden, especially in the event of another economic shock. The new loans would 
likely threaten a repeat of the same mistakes. Finally, the qualification for this 
process means the country has to meet economic conditions set by the IMF and 
the WB and these seem to be the same liberalisation and adjustment conditions 
the country went through during the 1990s. The Jubilee Debt Campaign (2011) 
argues that rather than making lenders more accountable for their actions, HIPC 
continues to give power to creditors, whilst making it more difficult to empower 
local democratic control over economic decisions.      
The argument for not taking the HIPC route was supported by Abdul Rahman 
Babu, a former Tanzanian Minister who argues that the HIPC Initiative comes 
with its own terms of engagement and these terms are usually not the terms that 
Zimbabwe wants. He also claims that the IMF cure is worse than the disease and 
the monetarist solutions of the IMF and the World Bank are not for reactivating 
the basic sectors of the economy, but for pushing countries deeper into the world 
market that continues to operate according to its predetermined order of priorities 
(The IMF is no Father Christmas, 2013).  




• Establishing a good track record of reform could prove difficult given 
its history of reforms. 
• Ensuring full participation by all creditors to support the country’s 
efforts towards debt sustainability. Having all the creditors agree to 
support the debt relief cause is likely to prove challenging given the 
current relationship that exist between Zimbabwe and some of the Paris 
Club members. 
The other aspect of the debt relief happens to touch the subject of moral hazards. 
The moral hazard effect of the debt relief is that it might induce debtors to believe 
that creditors have taken a softer stance and that they will be more willing to 
forgive any future debt, when the likelihood to obtain a repayment decreases 
substantially. The debtor’s moral hazard is based on the fact that countries could 
pursue over expansionary domestic policies recurring to external debt, on the 
expectations of a future debt cancellation by multilateral institutions. 
On the other hand creditor moral hazard is due to the fact that the expectation of 
debt reduction, “encourages private international capital markets to underestimate 
the risks associated with lending to individual countries or group of countries and 
therefore to overlend” (Bird, 2007). In the event of the being debt cancelled, the 
country could find itself exposed to vulture funders. Vulture funders who buy 
debt owed by countries in default at a cheap price may sue the countries for the 
full amounts including interest as there is no requirement for vulture fund owners 
to reduce the level of their claimed debt. 
For Zimbabwe, is debt relief a viable solution or a waste of time and money? 
According to Rigoglioso (2003) arguments from both sides of the coin have 
appeared to be theoretically plausible and persuasive, making the debate 
particularly prolonged and acrimonious. Peter Henry, an associate professor of 
economics at Stanford Graduate School of Business acknowledged that while 
both sides hold strong views, they have not bothered to look at the facts. 
In a study titled “Debt Relief: What Do the Markets Think? Funded by the 
National Science Foundation and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy 
Research, Professor Henry and Stanford graduate student Serkan Arslanalp 
analysed data that may have settled the question. They examined how the stock 
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markets of the 16 developing countries that reached debt relief agreements under 
the Brady Plan between 1989 and 1995 responded to news of their own Brady 
agreement. The researchers found that the local stock markets of these countries 
appreciated by an average of 60 percent in real dollar terms in the year prior to 
the announcement-the period in which each country was outlining its debt relief 
strategy with the anticipation of being accepted under the Brady Plan. 
For these countries, evidence showed that debt relief was beneficial because 
market participants expected it to have a positive economic effect. There was a 
greater influx of foreign investment capital and higher levels of economic growth 
in these countries. As would be expected, the Brady Plan countries ran into 
temporary difficulty servicing their debt resulting in creditors rushing to collect 
their loans all at once. 
According to Rigoglioso (2003), while the research confirmed the benefits of debt 
relief for the Brady Plan countries, it surprisingly revealed that debt relief is not 
the best use of funds across the board. In particular, the study found that debt 
relief for the HIPC mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa will not produce the salutary 
effects that it did for the Brady countries. This is so because the HIPC countries 
are very different patients in that while the Brady countries suffered from 
temporary inability to service their debt exacerbated by creditors demanding 
payment all at once, the poor countries from Africa suffer from a more 
fundamental problem. They lack basic social infrastructure that forms the basis 
for profitable economic activity – things like well-defined property rights, roads, 
schools, hospitals and clean water. 
Professor Henry explained that since the HIPC group’s principal problem is lack 
of social infrastructure, “there is little to no scope for profitable lending to them 
in the first place.” To them Henry believes there is no reason to believe that debt 
relief will stimulate s sudden rush of foreign capital that leads to higher 
investment growth. The implication of the study is that HIPC should be targeted 
not for debt relief but for direct aid that would assist such governments in 
building social infrastructure as this is what will make them attractive places for 
both domestic and foreign investments.   
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Zimbabwe could follow in the footsteps of Zambia and the DRC in resolving the 
unsustainable debt overhang.  Zambia with a debt of US$4 billion opted for the 
HIPC initiative and under difficult circumstances that included failing to meet 
debt relief circumstances managed to secure debt write off. The WB recently 
approved the largest debt write-off for the DRC, which saw the IMF follow suit. 
The DRC debt relief was expected to generate total debt savings of US$12.3 
billion including US11.1 billion under the enhanced HIPC and US$1.2 billion 
under the MDRI. 
 
4.3. Costs of China’s Presence in Africa 
There is a trap of a good versus evil dichotomy when it comes to evaluating 
Chinese energy and resource activities in Africa. To simply argue that the 
Chinese presence in Africa is mostly good or mostly bad for African development 
is missing the dynamics and the complexities of the relationship. It is important to 
study China-Africa energy and resource relations by focusing on the external 
dimensions of the two-way interaction, but that alone is inadequate to get a more 
in-depth view of the ways the Chinese do things in Africa. (Jiang, 2009). The 
Chinese may bring benefits to the hosting countries but they are not primarily in 
those places to serve local interests.   
China’s “miracle” growth of GDP has come with heavy price tags on wages, 
workers’ welfare, the eco-system and political reforms. Many have realised the 
negative impact of the Chinese development model on the country itself but few 
have examined what it means to Chinese foreign policy, especially the behaviour 
of Chinese enterprises abroad. Its engagement with Africa has raised a number of 
policy issues and implications. Economically, China’s relationship with Africa 
could be classified as, at best, schizophrenic – “the rising prices of commodities 
have benefitted African exporting countries, but conversely this has negative 
impacts on countries dependent on imports of the same commodities such as oil. 
 Similarly imports of Chinese manufactured goods have, on the one hand, 
provided low income consumers in Africa with much cheaper alternatives to 
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more expensive goods. On the other hand evidence shows that imports from 
China have displaced African producers, which has resulted in job losses. 
The major implications of China’s investment in fragile states have witnessed the 
encouragement of authoritarian rule, high military expenditure, corruption, 
suppression of opposition. The danger has been that large Chinese financial 
assistance has managed to forestall meaningful political and economic reforms 
especially in those resource-rich countries with considerable natural resources to 
collateralise huge loans. The danger according to Horaz (2011) is that the 
windfall from Chinese engagement has created complacency and arrest progress 
towards needed reform. As one critic noted, “revenue from trade (and taxes), 
development assistance and other means of support (from China) widen margins 
of manoeuvre for Africa’s autocrats and help them to rein in domestic demands 
for democracy and the respect for human rights.   
Idun-Arkhurst and Laing, (2007) raises concerns that China’s success in lifting 
millions of its population out of poverty in the last three decades without electoral 
democracy and a free press may offer an irresistible model of development for 
African governments who are chafed by donor pressure for Western-styled 
political reforms.  China’s increasing role as a donor and financier for Africa has 
implications for the donor community and the diminishing leverage they have on 
enforcing policies of governmental transparency. While having many potential 
positive effects on African development, if not sanitised Chinese aid and 
investments could create what one scholar has described as the “Dos Santos 
effect”: the entrenchment of non-democratic regimes and increasing political 
assertiveness against Western donors and their reform demands. 
The key concern to western donors is that the offers of ready money from Beijing 
allows poor-country governments to turn down aid that comes with demands that 
they work to improve good governance and incorporate adequate environmental 
and social protections within development projects. The most pervasive views is 
that China is wrecking international efforts to bring economic and political sanity 
to impoverished and conflict-ridden communities in Africa by bankrolling corrupt 
and repressive regimes as shown by the following examples:  
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• China is said to have pushed aside the World Bank and its efforts to 
tackle corruption by stepping in with a “no-strings attached” loan to 
fund railways in Nigeria. 
•  In Sudan China supplied weapons to the country and vetoed attempts 
by the Security Council to censor Sudan for the civil war in Darfur 
(Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, 2007). 
•   In Angola Beijing scuttled the Western donor attempts to bring 
transparency to Angola’s oil financial management by offering a US$2 
billion, 1.5% 17 year soft loan in exchange of 10 000 barrels of oil per 
day. 
• In Zimbabwe, China helped rehabilitate roads, build power stations and 
provide other infrastructural assistance worth US$1 billion in exchange 
of chrome and supplying arms at a time when the West had imposed 
arms embargo on the country.   
China has remained unapologetic of the fact that its aid and investment are not 
tied to demands for political or economic reforms  
Schmitt (2007) is concerned about the impact of the resource curse syndrome in 
developing countries. While the phenomenon of the resource curse is well known 
in Africa, he is worried the resource rich countries of Africa still risk staying 
trapped in extracting and exporting their resources without benefiting from spill 
over effects to the entire economy. The countries that benefit today from a rapid 
increase of world market prices of oil and other raw materials need to prepare 
their future economies and strategically invest in diversifying them. 
Haroz (2011) concurs that African countries have failed to negotiate better deals 
that can better transform their economies The implication of this is that even the 
resource-rich countries with greater leverage in their dealings with China have 
not converted this advantage to their advantage. On a broader level, the AU has 
also failed to coordinate African engagement with China.     
China’s modernisation efforts not only feature a heavy industrial structure and a 
fast-growing auto industry but also attract the relocation of many polluting 
industries by American and other Western multinationals to China. They have 
caused severe damage to China’s environment and the overall eco-system and in 
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the process have made China one of the worst polluters on earth. This has 
transcended to Africa where Chinese enterprises have little environmental 
consciousness, and do not possess much expertise in environmental assessment or 
protection. Thus when they go to Africa and other parts of the world with 
primarily the extraction of energy and resources in mind, they are not natural 
promoters of the environment of the host countries. 
Haroz (2011) suggests that if China’s cut-throat capitalism continues to 
externalise its negative aspects to Chinese practises in Africa, only corrupt 
regimes in some of the African countries will benefit instead of the ordinary 
people. He believes there will certainly be more backlashes of local resentment 
against the Chinese presence. Most of China’s major investments are in countries 
that are either embroiled in domestic political conflicts or have just emerged from 
prolonged internal conflicts exposing the investments to disruption. The 
implication of this is that China’s foreign policy of non-interference in domestic 
affairs of host countries, a likely unsustainable one in the long future. At some 
point in time, China may need to protect its long-term interests.   
4.4 Beijing   Consensus compared with the Washington Consensus  
The Washington consensus advocates for a free market economy driven by the 
private sector while the Beijing consensus emphasise that the importance of the 
government role in the economy. This dichotomy between the Western 
“regulatory state” and the Eastern “developmental state” has according to Turin 
(2010) has become acute as in the Western version, the government refrained 
from interfering in the market place whereas China intervened actively in the 
economy in order to guide or promote particular substantive goals. As a result of 
this policy thrust China has managed to cut by 235 million the number of its 
citizens living in absolute poverty while the World Bank confirmed that China 
contributed to 67 percent of the total reduction of global poverty during the last 
25 years.  
While the Washington consensus has strict condition on its loans, there is no 
absolute truth in the fact that the Beijing Consensus does not require conditions 
apart from recognising the “One China” policy.  In theory, it might sound so but 
in practise the Beijing consensus requires both political and economic conditions. 
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The West is demonised for its political conditions on its loan yet China is also 
guilty of the same sin. The fact that China requires that borrowing countries cease 
to recognise Taiwan and provide political support in the world bodies like the 
United Nations is in itself a conditional leverage.   
It sounds as though China’s conditions are far worse than those of the West, as 
the Beijing consensus use their own companies for projects in Africa in addition 
to employing its own citizens in high skilled jobs compromising any prospects of 
technology and skills transfer. 
On the other hand it is argued that what the Beijing Consensus offers Africa isn’t 
limited to just money. Under the auspices of the China-Africa Cooperation 
Forum, China has committed to contributing to the development of human 
resources in Africa by establishing a fund that is jointly administered and used by 
various Chinese ministries in order to train African personnel and as a result has 
managed to ingrate itself with both African governments and the general 
population. China’s recognition that African development centres on more than 
on just economic growth has led to a rising contribution of more substantial 
requirements. Historically, China deployed its first medical team in 1964 at the 
invitation of the Algerian government. Since then, China has cumulatively sent 
over 15 000 doctors to more than 47 African countries and treated approximately 
180 million African patients. 
Williamson (2004: 6) in Turin (2010) described the Washington Consensus as 
being interpreted to mean bashing the state, a new imperialism creating a laissez-
faire global economy based on GDP as the only thing that matters. The Beijing 
Consensus rejects this notion instead suggesting an increased focus on measures 
such as quality of life and individual equity. This is in line with UN Development 
Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) whose standard provide an 
alternative to the view of development equated exclusively with economic 
growth.   
 Most of the criticism is linked to the adoption of these principles that were 
detrimental to a number of developing countries by the IMF and the World Bank. 
Where the Washington was prescribing the same strict and homogeneous reforms 
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to all developing countries, the Beijing Consensus recognises the need for a 
unique approach according to each nation’s unique challenges. 
In his comparison of the two consensus, McKinnon, (2010) found that it is hard 
to define the Beijing Consensus as a set of rules because of its pragmatism 
involving “commitment to innovation and constant experimentation” and is also 
tainted with Chinese specific commercial interest such as extraction of minerals. 
In contrast he views that the Washington Consensus’ agencies’ principles while 
selfless in their aim to raise per capita incomes and welfare in recipient countries 
ran the risk that aid recipients became permanent supplicants. 
4.4.1 Is it a win-win relationship?  
The fact that Chinese companies use mainly Chinese labour is a disadvantage for 
the African country concerned. The preference to hire Chinese nationals and long 
hours of work expected by Chinese managers is causing conflict with local labour 
and cultures. It also means no local employment is created and that no knowledge 
and experience are transferred (Adisu and Sharkey, 2010; Van Dijk, 2009). 
While Zafar (2007) recognises the positive impact the Chinese investment has 
had on the continent, his concerns are that most of China’s investments are based 
on capital-intensive natural resource extraction and will not contribute to local 
employment generation and the long-term economic development. Secondly he 
observed that China’s influence on global energy demand and on oil markets will 
lead to increased energy prices for net oil importers in Africa worsening their 
terms of trade. Finally he feared that issues like corruption and governance which 
had moved to the forefront of the development agenda may slide back.  
Most political commentators agree that the Beijing Consensus recipe has become 
quite toxic for many countries. There are fears that the emerging donors like 
China are encouraging poor policies, lowering standards and increasing debt 
burdens in countries to which they are offering aid.  
The first area of concern is the level of finance being advanced to African states. 
The Chinese lending to Africa has prompted a renewed discussion about debt 
sustainability. The deals that China is negotiating with Africa according to 
traditional donors and civil society have the possibility of re-indebting especially 
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those countries that have just benefitted from debt relief under the highly indebted 
poor countries (HIPC) and the multi-lateral debt relief initiative (MDRI). China is 
accused of not respecting the debt sustainability framework (DSF) and other 
financial sector standards as well as not being transparent regarding the volume 
and the conditions of Chinese credits to African governments.  
However the World Bank (2007) noted that a comparison of recent debt relief 
figures with estimates of potential indebtedness to China suggests that some of 
the major beneficiaries of Chinese finance, accounting for more than one third of 
the total, were countries that did not benefit from Western debt relief initiative.  
Wood (2008) claim that there is no clear evidence that China is re-indebting the 
HIPC en masse. 
Apart from the debt sustainability some analysts have identified that the financing 
arrangement especially for those cash strapped resource rich countries in need of 
major infrastructure need is skewed towards China. According to Corkin (2007) 
and Davies (2010), the financing arrangement is also meant to addresses China’s 
domestic challenge of structural unemployment. According to the China Exim 
Bank’s concessional loan requirements, Chinese contractors must be awarded the 
infrastructure contract financed by the loan. Furthermore, in principle no less than 
50 per cent of the contract’s procurement in terms of equipment, materials, 
technology or services must come from China. 
The other area of serious concern is the influx of cheap goods into the continent. 
While Chinese exports provide cheaper access to more goods and services for the 
well-being of the people, in the long-term this is bad for Africa because it 
destroys local manufacturing capabilities and competitiveness. There is growing 
resentment that cheap Chinese imports are killing local manufacturing 
possibilities. The ‘China Price’ has hit manufacturers worldwide. For example in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, there have been protests against cheap clothing 
imported from China. In countries like Ghana, South Africa and Zambia, there is 
a growing Chinese population of small traders who sell cheap Chinese wares 
(Idun-Arkhurst and Laing, 2007). 
On the subject of dumping cheap low quality products to Africa,Van Dijk (2009) 
argues that China is just using product differentiation to promote its exports by 
78 
 
exporting cheap products to Africa for low-income consumers. It is not only the 
quality, he explains, but the price is also adjusted to the market 
As identified above, the implication of the cheap clothing to Africa had serious 
repercussions on the economy and employment situation of some of the nations. 
Alden, Large and Oliviera (2008) and Tull (2006) describe the impact of Chinese 
competition on the African textile industry beginning 2005 as a result of the non-
renewal of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA).    
At the expiry of the MFA in January 2005, Africa’s intermittent textile boom 
witnessed a meltdown, American demand for textiles plunged in favour of even 
cheaper garments made in China, and African-based Chinese companies were 
already relocating their production back to China. The impact of this was 
considerable for African clothing and textile exporters benefitting from the US 
AGOA. 
 Overall African clothing exports under AGOA declined by 17 per cent in 2005. 
Lesotho and Madagascar’s exports fell by 14 per cent. The main casualty was 
South Africa, with a 45 per cent decrease in exports. The impact on employment 
in 2004-5 was tangible: employment in the clothing sector in Lesotho declined by 
28.9 per cent, 6000 textile workers lost jobs in Lesotho in January 2005 alone; in 
Swaziland employment in this industry fell by 56.2 per cent and in South Africa 
by 12 per cent.  
The move by China to locate their clothing and textile companies in Africa had 
two closely related objectives: first, to exploit the preferential access to the US 
market that AGOA had conceded to certain African products, including clothing 
and textile. Second, shifting parts of the production to Africa enabled Chinese 
firms to circumvent the trade barriers that the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing of the Uruguay Round had imposed on them to protect markets in 
Europe and the US from cheap Asian imports. 
In order to show the political tension that has been caused by the Chinese 
presence in Africa, the China card was playing in local politics. In Zambia, the 
then opposition leader Michael Sata had promised to drive out the Chinese if he 
won the 2006 presidential election accusing the Chinese of exploitation and 
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turning Zambia into a dumping ground. The former opposition leader likened aid 
and investment as Trojan horses when quoted saying: 
“You recruit Chinese doctors and they end up having Chinese restaurants 
in town. They are just flooding the country with human beings instead of 
investments and the government is jumping. We have to be very careful 
because if we leave them unchecked, we will regret it. China is sucking 
from us. We are becoming poorer because they are getting our wealth. 
Instead of creating jobs for the local workforce, they bring in Chinese 
workers to cut wood and carry water. We don’t want Zambia to be a 
dumping ground for their human beings” (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing, 2007; 
Brautigam, 2009). 
The late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa countered that, “The Chinese 
government has a brought a lot of development to this country and these are the 
people you are demonstrating against.” 
On the other hand others argue that China is only presenting itself as a developing 
country that has not come to exploit Africa, but rather wants to create win-win 
situations, while following a different approach than the European model. Their 
argument is that China’s energy expansion in Africa, as fast as it has been in 
recent years, is still relatively small by all major measurements, and charge that 
Western media has blown things out of proportion.  
By offering their African counterparts a mix of political and economic incentives, 
the Chinese government is successfully driving home the message that increased 
Sino-African cooperation will inevitably result in a “win-win” situation for both 
sides. The power of this argument is enhanced by a subtle discourse which posits 
China not only as an appealing alternative partner to the West, but also as a better 
choice for Africa (Tull, 2006). 
 
4.4.2 Is there any consensus? 
According to Williamson (2012), finding a definition of exactly what is meant by 
the Beijing Consensus is no easy task. Williamson the architecture of the 
Washington Consensus argues that many discussions of the “Beijing Consensus” 
80 
 
define it as an alternative to the Washington Consensus without explaining the 
essence of the alternative. Ramo explained that the Beijing Consensus is “this 
new physics of power and development” and “is flexible enough that it is barely 
classifiable as a doctrine”.  
The model is as much as about social change as economic change. Ramo defines 
the consensus as simply three theorems of which the first concerns using 
innovations that offer the best bargain, the second promotes working through 
chaos management and the third is that the concept of consensus contains a 
theory of self-determination. The lack of any sort of list of what the Beijing 
Consensus involves is disappointing according to Williamson (2012) who is 
forced to conclude that the term is being used to describe the development 
policies pursued by China. 
Rebol (2010) concurs with Williamson (2010) mentioning that this term, has 
created a lot of confusion as it implies to be an alternative to the Washington 
Consensus. While the Washington Consensus describes a set of recommended 
specific economic policies which were popularised by the IMF and World Bank, 
the term implies that there is a certain agreement coming out of Beijing, which in 
fact is not the case.   
Kennedy (2010 suggest that Cooper obviously chose the term “Beijing 
Consensus” as a provocative response to the Washington Consensus, but the 
Beijing Consensus’s three theorems above do not parallel those of the 
Washington Consensus.  
According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus rejects several key Washington 
Consensus market liberalisation concepts. It approaches privatisation and free 
trade with caution rather by pursuing them with zeal as demanded by 
Washington’s neo-liberal leaders. China is defined by innovation and testing of 
new ideas such as the Special Economic Zones. The Consensus allowed Beijing 
to create an environment where testing and failure is acceptable (Kennedy, 2010). 
The ability of the Beijing Consensus to ensure a sustainable economic 
development in Africa has also been questioned. Williamson (2012) in Sanusi 
(2012) argues that the Beijing Consensus could best be described as protecting 
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China’s “self-interest” rather than a genuine concern for Africa’s developmental 
needs. 
One of the hallmarks of the Beijing Consensus is that it does not dictate finite 
policy to those who may seek to use it as a model unlike the Washington 
Consensus which clearly delineates their ten recommendations. This fact alone 
has challenged the Beijing Consensus as to whether it is useful as a development 
model as the basis of its broad nature lacks specificity. Dirlik (2006) a China 
specialist cited in (Turin, 2010) calls the Beijing Consensus, a “notion, rather than 
a concept or an idea, because it does not have any of the coherence that we 
associate with either of those terms.” Dirlik attributes this to marginalisation of 
the population by these new development policies, the environmental challenge 
China is facing concluding that the implementation of China’s development 
ideals has obviously not been without its flaws. 
Other scholars (Lai-Hai, Lee & Chan, 2008: 12) echoes Dirlik that while the 
Beijing Consensus have legitimate value, calling it a “consensus” may be overly 
flamboyant but instead they prefer to refer to these ideas as preferably as a “China 
model.”  They claim that there should not be any universal blueprint for 
development imposed by external actors from the above. While some analysts 
may disagree with the terminology that sums up China’s experience, the majority 
by and large resonates with the claim that the state should play a predominant role 
in reform and development.  
According to Turin, (2010), the feasibility of implementing the Beijing 
Consensus as a development model outside of China is twofold. Firstly the 
Beijing Consensus is limited by China’s own unique experience with its long 
experiment with socialism accompanied with a Confucian tradition and its united 
national identity which makes everything distinctly Chinese. Secondly, the 
Beijing Consensus serves as a convenient starting point for identifying a mode for 
development that is independent from the currently accepted model. In a sense, 
the Beijing Consensus is highly valuable to the developing world by it serving to 
enhance the voice of developing nations in global affairs. The fact that it does not 
dictate any specific policy that adherents must undertake makes it thus less 
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outwardly recognisable as a “model” but the ideas behind it create a base upon 
which policy can be shaped. 
Ultimately while the Beijing Consensus may not be actually a “consensus” in the 
same way that the Washington Consensus has come to be known, its most 
important aspect is that it may be an approach to global relationships that seeks, 
in multinational relationships, a new global order not only founded on economic 
relationship, but which also recognises political and cultural differences as well as 
differences in regional and national practises within a common global framework. 
It would certainly appear that the Beijing Consensus will continue to play a 
growing and increasingly important role in shaping future development initiatives 
throughout the world. Its role is realised both as an alternative development 
philosophy and as a gauge to the changing global environment.   
4.5 Recommendations 
4.5.1  Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe needs to swallow its pride and admit that it has a huge problem that 
requires urgent action. The resolution of the debt issue should be a priority for 
Zimbabwe. China’s involvement in Zimbabwe’s resource sector, while welcome, 
will not solve the Zimbabwean problem. It is actually creating more debt for the 
country.  
While the resource-for-loan backed strategy is a noble one, it is currently not the 
best option as it will not solve the debt problem. The country possesses enormous 
natural resources which if used appropriately will lift the country out of its debt 
trap.  One reasonable but controversial way is utilising diamond revenues to clear 
the IMF arrears so that it can open up new lines of credit which can help in debt 
resolution. Zimbabwe should use its leverage on resources such as platinum and 
diamonds to negotiate deals that are in the interest of the country. This requires 
putting in place institutions that can guarantee maximisation of natural resources 
by the citizens. 
The country could also request assistance from the ADB Fragile States Facility to 
regularise its debt as outlined under section 3.1.11 of the Operations Guidelines 
of the Fragile State Facility. Under this facility, the country has to show 
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commitment in addressing its arrears (ADB, 2013).  The current piece-meal 
assistance from mostly off-budget support and China is not sustainable in the 
long-term.  
While China seem to have found its comparative advantage of exploiting natural 
resources in Africa, it is time Zimbabwe take reasonable steps to ensure that 
robust economic fundamentals are established within the economy to ensure that 
this recovery translate into sustainable growth going forward. With the 
anticipated slowdown of the Chinese economy, it is imperative that containing the 
risk of contagion while difficult in an era of global interconnectedness, Zimbabwe 
is being advised to put robust economic fundamentals that will ensure sustainable 
growth recovery.  
In the interim the country should work on key reforms aimed at addressing 
external indebtedness and improving the investment climate especially in the area 
of property rights, indigenisation and land reform will be vital if the country is to 
continue to make progress. The improvement of the investment climate is of 
paramount importance if the country is to attract the much needed FDI. The 
country continues to be one of the least competitive economies in the World. The 
World Bank 2011 “Doing Business Survey” ranked the country 157 out of 183 
countries in the world well below South Africa at 34, Namibia at 69 and 
Botswana at 52. 
There is a need for policy consistency and political will to continue with the 
reforms especially those directly associated with the implementation of the 
ZAADDS. These include the reconciliation and validation of debt; re-engagement 
with creditors and the international community for the removal of the restrictive 
measures; negotiating for arrears clearance; new financing and comprehensive 
debt relief and strengthening of the Debt Management Office (ADB, 2011). 
The collapse of the economy by 2008 resulted in a collapse of social services 
especially in the areas of health, education and access to water and sanitation and 
also increased the levels of unemployment and poverty. This has heavily 
impacted on the country’s ability to meet its Millennium Development Goals. 
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The short-term recovery measures pursued to date have helped to revive the 
economy, but they cannot sustain growth over a long time horizon. This is 
because short-run output fluctuations are determined primarily by aggregate 
demand, while long-run growth reflects the combined effects of accumulation of 
capital, labour and productivity improvements and involves structural supply-side 
strategies that enable individuals, firms, industries and the entire economy to 
become more productive on a sustained basis (ADB, 2011)  
There is need to resolve the issue of diamond revenues accounting, a rising wage 
bill which currently account for almost 70 percent of government revenue leaving 
barely nothing for infrastructure and other key government expenditure targets.    
On the whole it would be unfair to blame China for acting to further their 
interests. It is incumbent for the Zimbabwean leadership to put in place 
programmes and strategies that will enable global direct investments to contribute 
to growth instead of ‘pawning’ the country and submitting its citizens to 
exploitation. 
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, Zimbabwe can take lessons from what 
other resource-rich countries have tried, such as using stabilisation policies where 
for example when resource prices are high, revenues are set aside so that when 
prices fall, the government can use the funds to cushion the blow. It could also 
park part of the proceeds from resources in offshore “funds for future” in the form 
of Sovereign Wealth Fund (Economist, 2005). Theoretically what these funds do 
is not only spreading the wealth over several generations, but helps avoid over-
appreciation of the local currency. A more contentious idea is disbursing revenues 
directly to every household as a way of ensuring that tangible benefits are 
realised. I say contentious because this idea seems to be well-received in stable 
economies but for Zimbabwe, it could be perceived as wasteful expenditure and 
could also open doors for cronyism and corrupt tendencies. Norway has an 
offshore oil fund that has been touted as a model for developing countries like 
Zimbabwe but virtuous as it may be; Norwegians have been raiding it for 
politically popular causes. Just across the Zambezi River, Zambia had a 
stabilisation scheme that managed its mineral exports but when prices soared in 
the 1970s, they dropped it.  
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Finally as reported by Karumbidza (2006) it would be naïve to think that China is 
motivated by the need to salvage the Zimbabwean economy from its economic 
abyss. For the Chinese, the investment in Zimbabwe is nothing different from 
Chinese ventures elsewhere on the continent. What Zimbabwe should guard 
against is opening up to a new form of imperialism by Chinese, cognisant of the 
fact that at the end of the day, like any other investor, China is competitively 
driven by the profit and will ultimately look out for their interests. China is in 
Africa to pursue expansion, consistent with its search for global dominance and to 
avoid being out-competed by the US. In order to achieve this, it requires 
resources, raw materials, markets and above all support from the continent.   
The HIPC and the Angola Model should not compete but rather complement each 
other in finding a solution, hence Zimbabwe is advised not to shun its traditional 
partners but rather find ways of resolving the debt issue with both the East and 
the West. 
As Angola had offered to bail Portugal, maybe as the Reserve Bank Governor of 
Zimbabwe, Dr Gideon Gono suggested, Zimbabwe might one day find itself in a 
similar situation, volunteering to bail out Britain from her 1.2 trillion pound debt 
debts (Miller, 2012) but for now it remains a pipe dream. 
 
4.5.2 Africa 
It is evident that China follows a clear political and economic strategy with regard 
to Africa but has Africa developed a China policy? How can African countries 
assure to benefit from the expanding relations with China not only in the short, 
but also in the long run? What options do they have? What is their room for 
manoeuvre (Schmitt, 2007)? 
While the advent of China represents an encouraging trend for Africa, given the 
magnitude of its infrastructure deficit, the key challenge for African governments 
is how to make the best strategic use of all external sources of infrastructure 
funding to promote growth and reduce poverty on the continent. The key lies in 
the hands of African policy makers to take advantage of this opportunity to boost 
economic growth. There is need to re-examine the conditions under which foreign 
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companies enter African markets in order to cultivate and harness the 
development of local companies while Africa can still play the resource card. In 
order to level the playing field and have a plan for win-win relationship, African 
leaders and in particular the African Union through its various sectors should 
harness growing commercial and political ties with China in order to leverage 
them for sustainable domestic growth by seriously looking at the following key 
issues: 
• There is need for African governments need to lay claim to ownership of 
their development process. This can be done by using the leverage afforded 
by rising commodity prices to negotiate more participation by the African 
private sector in these construction deals. This should see the formulation of 
legislation and regulatory framework that enforces joint-ventures and the 
employment of the local labour in order to help technology transfer and 
facilitate economic knock-on effects in related industries. 
• The need to guard against the resource curse especially for resource rich 
countries through channelling windfall revenue from export commodities 
into developing local capacity for infrastructural and economic 
rejuvenation. This way African governments need to design policies that 
equip domestic industries to collaborate with Chinese and other foreign 
investors. The large windfalls from resource rents should encourage African 
governments to pursue aggressive national development goals, including 
strategically consolidating their local firms and positioning them as a matter 
of policy to partner and learn from Chinese companies in major contracts. A 
fundamental understanding of Chinese domestic development dynamics 
will help African countries to maximise their resource fortunes and avoid 
the “resource curse. 
• Crafting of policy frameworks that facilitate the emergence of a vibrant 
private sector that can stimulate economic diversification as opposed to 
maintaining a state-led economy reliant on single export commodity. 
• Engaging on issues of human rights, environmental protection and impacts 
on communities of joint development projects. China should be pushed to 
follow international conventions and universal standards. The involvement 
of civil society organisations in the Sino-China relations as a crucial step 
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for increasing public awareness of the threats and opportunities presented 
by China’s engagement with Africa should form part of this engagement. 
• There is need to push African governments to be more responsive to 
citizens’ needs and uphold their interests and avoid the exploitative 
problems that Africa experienced with many institutions of global 
governance like the WB and the IMF.  At the same time, the historical 
relationship of China with Africa must be well-understood, owned and 
driven by citizens (AFRODAD, 2010).  
For Africa’s sake, the US should push for the post Washington Consensus, but in 
a way that recognises their own obligations towards developing states. For this 
purpose, both the US and China should rethink the way they pump money into 
African states. For Africa’s traditional donors, it is time to engage China as a 
major player in designing the rules of global economic governance and to review 
aid conditions to identify what does and does not work for African development 
in order to continue to remain influential and credible in Africa (Idun-Arkhurst 
and Laing, 2007). 
To avoid a blame-game and potential conflict which surely would not be 
beneficial for African recipient countries, Wenping (2013) recommends a two-
way street mind-set and practise are needed. On the one hand, China’s foreign aid 
should become more transparent and seek collaboration with other donors. On the 
other hand, OECD donors should also understand more about China’s aid model 
from the angle of history and culture, make sure they avoid politicisation and seek 
active partnership with key aid institutions in China.  In terms of understanding 
Africa, for many years traditional donors have tended to see Africa “as a place for 
charity” rather than as a “growth market”, new actors like China on the contrary, 
see a land of opportunities. The new discourse has shifted from aid effectiveness 
to development effectiveness meaning that there is more focus on results on the 
ground and less on procedures or process.      
It is in Beijing’s interests to forge a truly “win-win” situation in its relations with 
Africa, while exploring a cooperative framework with the United States and the 
EU countries to ensure that the major powers do not engage in hostile policies 
that harm both the African people and their own interests. The lessons for Africa 
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is that they should learn to negotiate on their own terms, identify priorities, and 
leverage opportunities to further their own interests.  
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Chapter 5: Research Conclusions 
The research study set out to explore whether the Chinese strategy commonly referred as the 
Beijing Consensus can be beneficial to Zimbabwe. The study also looked at the costs of the 
Chinese presence in the country. The determination of the benefits was tested using the 
Angola model, the resource-backed loan facility China has been using in resource-rich 
countries as an option against the much favoured HIPC initiative. The findings have shown 
that while the Chinese strategy has offered more opportunities for African countries, it is not 
beneficial for Zimbabwe under its current status.  The conclusion is that the Chinese 
development strategy cannot be generalised. The fact that the Angola Model worked for 
Angola does not necessarily mean it can work for Zimbabwe.  In the same, the fact that the 
strategy is not benefitting Zimbabwe does not mean it will not benefit Mozambique. 
Overall, the research aimed to determine if the Beijing Consensus is an alternative 
development strategy for Africa. The research provided the background of Africa and 
China’s relationship and why African states prefer to deal with China than before. The 
conclusion is that the Beijing Consensus currently gives African states much needed 
breathing space but this does not conclude that the model is an alternative in the same as the 
Washington Consensus is viewed. The significance economic miracle of China under the 
Beijing Consensus has challenged the Washington Consensus, but this remarkable success, is 
arguably argued that it might not be sustainable in the long run due to its maintenance of 
large SOEs and authoritarianism which runs contra to people’s aspirations. Secondly, the 
success of this model is based on China’s experience that span over 60 years of trial; hence 
the policies it used may not be applicable to other countries. 
 While the option provided an alternative route for African countries in particular for those 
countries that can no longer get unconditional support from Western countries or the Bretton 
Woods institutions, there is need to fashion a new development strategy that is focused 
towards harnessing the continent’s rich natural resources. 
The study has shown that the post-Washington Consensus cannot be arrived at simply within 
the confines of Washington. The development of a successful development strategy will have 
to involve those in the developing world in an important and meaningful way. China with its 
development model has taken the first step as it embarks on a journey to show that the one-
size-fits-all policies promoted by the IMF/WB are doomed to fail. Policies that worked in one 
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country may not work in others. This is also a warning signal to African nations to heed that 
what has worked for China may not work for Africa.   
It is also important to note that while the Beijing consensus can be embraced as an 
alternative, some components of the Washington Consensus could still have a positive impact 
on developing African states. Although the SAPs could have failed in their purpose, which 
was to help African states take their place in the international financial system, the fact is that 
some aspects of economic reform programmes are still important components of stabilisation 
and reform. 
It is widely believed in some quarters that the US and in particular the Washington 
Consensus has much to offer Africa, despite its chequered history. African states could 
benefit from the stability that democracy often brings. What Africa can learn from this is that 
different states require different approaches. Whether they choose the Washington Consensus 
or the Beijing Consensus, it is entirely up to African governments to make whatever internal 
changes are necessary to ensure development and to make decisions as to which consensus 
would best serve African interests. It is by finding a balance between the two Consensuses 




Chapter 6: Areas for future research 
This research was focused on establishing whether the Beijing Consensus is an 
alternative to the Washington Consensus and in particular how resource-rich 
countries like Zimbabwe could benefit from the Chinese development strategy. 
This pitted the Beijing Consensus against the Washington Consensus as to which 
of the two models would lift Africa out of its misery that has plagued it for over 
six decades. 
To some the battle between the Beijing Consensus and the Washington 
Consensus is the best thing that could have happened for the continent while the 
other school of thought believes this has seriously affected Africa’s chance of 
developing its economy the way the Asian economy have done. Either way the 
emergency of the Beijing Consensus provided Africa with a missed opportunity 
to negotiate better deals. Apart from the controversial ill-structured Angola 
Model, China has also introduced its model of SEZs in Africa. At the 2006 
FOCAC China agreed to share with African countries its experience in the field 
of investment promotion relating to the establishment and management of SEZs. 
This commitment led to the establishment of six SEZs in six African countries 
which were being marketed as a “model” for future collaboration between China 
and the continent. Some of these SEZs projects are either a partnership with the 
host government or are 100 percent owned by China. 
Special Economic Zones have been in existence for over three centuries and 
Africa has had its share of experience with them. With the exception of Mauritius 
(Giannecchini, 2011), evidence seem to suggest that SEZs have not succeeded in 
Africa begging the question of whether SEZs work in African context. Zimbabwe 
established Export Processing Zones in 1994 but the concept failed to make any 
meaningful contribution to the economy despite the array of incentives that was 
accorded to the companies involved. The initiative had been launched with the 
hope that it would revive the export sector and contribute to the national 
economic growth. In 2000 South Africa introduced Industrial Development Zones 
(IDZ) at Coega, East London and Richards Bay but evidence suggests that they 
have not been as successful as anticipated (Altbeker, McKeown & Bernstein, 
2011).  As Jiang (2009) stated, the research agenda is still wide open, many issues 
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are yet to be explored, and patterns of behaviour to be established. Considering 
that SEZs are long-term oriented projects taking over a decade to mature, it would 
be an interesting and valuable for future research to explore the impact the six 
SEZs has had on the economies and standard of living for the people in areas 
hosting the SEZs.    
The findings of this study has shown that Africa still lack the skills of crafting 
and negotiating deals that truly benefit the larger populations. This was evident in 
most of the resource for infrastructure deals that were negotiated between China 
and Africa which were skewed in favour of China. Considering that SEZs are 
contained geographic regions characterised by relaxed laws and economic 
policies designed to attract foreign investment, it would be interesting to establish 
what special concessions the SEZs in Africa were granted considering that some 
countries were over-generous. Further research could also be undertaken to 
establish the uniqueness of the Chinese SEZs models in comparison with the 
















Adisu, K., & Sharkey, T. (2010). The Impact of Chinese Investment in Africa. International Journal of 
Business and Management. 
African Development Bank. (2011). Zimbabwe: Country Brief 2011-2013.  
AFRODAD. (2010). Assessing the growing role and developmental impact of China in Africa: An 
African perspective. Harare: AFRODAD Publications. 
Alden, C., Large, D., & Oliviera, R. S. (2008). China Returns to Africa: Anatomy of an Expansive 
Engagement.  
Altbeker, A., McKeown, K., & Bernstein, A. (2011). Special Economic Zones Lessons for South Africa 
from international evidence and local experience. The Round Table. Johannesburg: Centre 
for Development and Enterprise. 
Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation 
for novice researchers. The Qualitative Report, 13(4), 544-559. 
Bird, G. (2004). The IMF and Poor Countries: Towards a More Fulfilling Relationship. Developing 
Countries, Global Finance and the Role of the IMF: Towards a New Relationship. The Hague: 
Forum on and Development. 
Birdsall, N., & Fukuyama, F. (2011). The Post-Washington Consensus. Foreign Affairs - March/April 
Volume 90 Number 2, 45-53. 
Broad, R. (2004). The Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash: Shifting Debates and 
Policies. Globalisations, pp. 129-154. 
Broad, R., & Cavanagh, J. (1999). The Death of the Washington Consensus? World Policy Journal, 79-
88. 
Campos, I., & Vines, A. (2007). ANGOLA AND CHINA: A Pragramatic Partnership. Working Paper 
Presented at a CSIS Conference, "Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation," 
December 5, 2007. Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies. 
Chanakira, N. (2013, June 10). Zimbabwe must declare HIPC status, recommends Tony Hawkins. 
Retrieved from The Zimbabwean: http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/5788 
Chatelard, S. G. (2013, May 25). Africa must do more to profit from China. Africa News Report. 
Retrieved from Ghanalink. 
Chingono, H. (2010, November 01). Zimbabwe's Look East Ploicy. The China Monoitor Issue 57, pp. 4-
8. 
Chipendo, R. (2012, April 12). Preparing for China's economic slowdown. The Independent. 




Corkin, L. (2007). China's Contribution to the Development of African Infrastructure through 
Investment in the Extractive Industries. AFRODAD Occassional Papers Issue#8. 
Davies, M. (2010). How China is Influencing Africa's Development. Pretoria: OECD. 
Dijk, M. P. (2009). The New Presence of China in Africa. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Eisenman, J. (2005, July 5). Zimbabwe: China's Africa Ally. China Brief Vol 5. Issue 15. 
Gadzala, A., & Hanusch, M. (2010). African Perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging Popular 
Perceptions and Their Economic and Political Determinants. Oxford: AfroBarometer Working 
Papers. 
Gono, G. (2012). Commentary on the Zimbabwe Accelerated Arrears Clearance, Debt and 
Development. Harare: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
Haroz, D. (2011). China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation. Summer Vol 35:2, 65-88. 
Hawkins, A. (2013, September 6). Zimbabwe: Time running out. The Financial Mail, pp. 42-43. 
Huang, Y. (2010). Debating China's Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or The Washington 
Consensus. Academy of Management, 31-47. 
Idun-Arkhurst, I., & Laing, J. (2007). The Impact of the Chinese Presence in Africa. London: Africa 
Practise. 
IMF. (2013). Zimbabwe - Staff-Monitored Program - Country Report No. 13/193. IMF. 
Jaen, A. C. (undated). New roads to development: China in Africa.  
Jiang, W. (2009). Fuelling the Dragon: China's Rise and Its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa. 
The China Quarterly, 199, 585-609. 
Jubilee Debt Campaign. (2009, November 19). Zimbabwe: A HIPC? Retrieved from Jubilee Debt 
Campaign: http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=5222&tmpl=jdcmainprint 
Jubilee Debt Campaign. (2011). Uncovering Zimbabwe's Debt: The Case for a democratic solution to 
the unjust debt burden. London. 
Kaplinsky, R., McCormick, D., & Morris, M. (2007). The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Karl, T. L. (2006). Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract. Initiative for 
Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series. 
Karumbidza, J. B. (2013, August 5). Can China Save Zimbabwe's Economy? Retrieved from 
Pambazuka News: http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/38894/print 
Keenan, P. J. (2008). Curse or Cure? China's Investments In Africa and Their Effect on Human Rights.  
Kennan, P. J. (2009). Curse or Cure - China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditional Wealth. Berkeley 
Journal of International Law - Volume 27 Issue 1, 84-125. 
95 
 
Kennedy, S. (2010, June 1). The Myth of the Beijing Consensus. Journal of Contemporary China, pp. 
461-477. 
Lafargue, F. (2005). China's Presence in Africa.  
Lai-Ha, C., Lee, P. K., & Chan, G. (2008). Rethinking global governance: a China model in the making? 
Contemporary Politics Vol 14, No1, 3-19. 
Leo, B., & Moss, T. (2009). Moving Mugabe's Mountain: Zimbabwe's Path to Arrears Clearance and 
Debt Relief. Center for Global Development. 
Liu, Y., Zhong, L., & Thompson, T. (2011). Assistance of Chinese Characteristics - China's Aid Program 
in Africa and its Consequences. China's Role in Global and Regional Governance. Nanyang 
Technology University: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 
Machadu, C. (2012, April 19). Look East Policy Bears No Fruit For Zimbabwe. Retrieved from The 
Sino-Africa: http://www.sinoafrica.org/en/node/2016 
Machadu, C. (2013, September 25). Chinamasa's finance plan immoral: Biti. Retrieved from The 
Zimbabwe Situation: 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_chinamasa_finance_plan_immoral_biti/ 
Mangudhla, T. (2012, February 20). China ripping off Zim: Mutambara. Retrieved from The Daily 
News: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/feb21_2012/html...21/02/2012 
Matimaire, K. (2013, November 5). CZI castigates Anjin Operations. Retrieved from The Zimbabwean: 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsi_czi-castigates-anjin-operations/ 
McKinnon, R. I. (2010). China in Africa: the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus.  
Mikheyev, D. (2013, April 2). BRICS and US models: "Beijing Consensus" and "Washington 
Consensus". Retrieved from The Voice of Russia: 
http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_04_02/BRICS-and-US-models-Beijing-Consensus-and-
Washington ...25/09/2013 




Mushava, E. (2012, March 6). Chinese firms panning for gold in UMP. Retrieved from The Daily News: 
http://www.dailynews.co.zw 
Naim, M. (2000). "Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion". Foreign Policy. 
Nyakazeya, P. (2011, September 8). Zimbabwe: HIPC Status Best Option for Zimbabwe. Retrieved 
from Zimbabwe Independent: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109091102.html?viewall=1 




Rebol, M. (2010). Why the Beijing Consensus is a Non-Consensus: Implications for Contemporary 
China-Africa Relations. Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural & 
Economic Studies, 7-20. 
Reuters. (2011, February 4). China offers Zimbabwe $3 bln for platinum. Retrieved from The Reuters: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/04/ozatp-zimbabwe-china-platinum-
idAFJOE713..30/07/2013 
Richardson, C. J. (2013). Zimbabwe - Why Is One of the World's Least-Free Economies Growing So 
Fast? Cato Institute . 
Rigoglioso, M. (2003, March 15). Debt Relief Doesn't Help Small Countries . Retrieved from Stanford 
Graduate School of Business: 
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/econ_debtrelief.shtml 
Sanusi, L. S. (2012). Niether the Washington nor Beijing Consensus- developmental models to fit 
African realities and cultures. Eirenicon Africa Public Lecture Series (EAPLS) held at The Royal 
School of Medicine. London. 
Schmitt, G. (2007). Is Africa Turning East? China's new engagement in Africa and its implications on 
the macro-economic situation, the business environment and the private sector in Africa. 
Eschborn: Germany Technical Corporation. 
Shinn, D. (2011). The impact of China's Growing Influence in Africa . TheEuropean Financial Review, 
16-19. 
Smith, D. (2011, February 1). China posed to pour $10bn into Zimbabwe's ailing economy. Retrieved 
from The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/01/zimbabwe-china-10-
billion-economy/print 28/08/2013 
Strange, A., Parks, B., Tierney, M. J., Fuchs, A., Dreher, A., & Ramachandran, V. (2013). China's 
Development Finance to Africa: A media-Based Approach to Data Collection. Center for 
Global Development - Working Paper 323. 
The China Analyst. (2012, April). Retrieved from The Beijing Axis: 
http://www.thebeijingaxis.com/tca/editions/the-china-analyst-apr-2012/123-regional-focu 
The Economist. (2005, December 20). The curse of oil - The Paradox of the plenty. Retrieved from 
The Economist: http://www.economist.com/node/5323394/print 
The IMF is no Father Christmas . (2013, June 23). Retrieved from Insiderzim: 
http://www.insiderzim.com/stories/5798 
Tull, D. M. (2006). China's engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences. Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 459-479. 
Turin, D. R. (2010). "The Beijing Consensus: China's Alternative Development Model." . Retrieved 




Wang, J. (2009). The Economic Impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese 
Municipalities. London. 
Wang, J.-Y., & Bio-Tchane, A. (2008, Month). Africa's Burgeoning Ties with China. Retrieved from 
Finance and Development: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/03/wang.htm 
Williamson, J. (2000). What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus? The 
World Bank Research Observer, vol 15, no 2, 251-264. 
Williamson, J. (2012). Is the "Beijing Consensus" Now Dominant? Asia Policy, Number 13, 1-16. 
Woo, K. (n.d.). Beijing Consensus: model for sustainable development? Asia Pacific Housing Journal , 
50-59. 
Woods, N. (2006). Bretton Woods Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. (2013). Interim Strategy Note: Supporting Economic Recovery for Inclusive Growth for 
the Republic of Zimbabwe for the period FY 13-15.  
Yin, R. K. (1994a). Case Study Research: Design and methods. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Zafar, A. (2007). The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, 
Trade, Investment, and Aid Links. Oxford University Press. 
Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Interface. (2010). The HIPC Initiative: A Debt Relief Option for 
















Appendix A – Zimbabwe’s Economic Plans since 1997 and their implementation 
Year Economic plan/blueprint Results/Impact 
1997 Vision 2020, 1996-2020 Failed to achieve virtually all plan targets 
-Efficient Public Sector Resource Management 
-Industrialisation/Competitiveness 
-Infrastructure development 
-Privatise and Commercialise Public Entities 
-Human Resource Development 
-Better health delivery  
1998 The Three Year Medium Term 
Development Plan (TYMTDP, 1998-
2000 
-Planned macroeconomic indicators not achieved 
-Planned growth not achieved 
-Land reform not achieved 
-Infrastructural provision declined 
-Human resources and skills development not achieved 
2000 Millennium Economic Recovery 
Programme (MERP) 
Actual capital budget in the millennium budget was 
only 8% of total expenditures down from 11% in 1999 
-All plan targets remained on paper and ignored by 
government 
-Under high inflation, heavy distortions – adjustment 
costs inequitably borne by the poor 
-slashed education, health and social welfare budgets  
2003 National Economic Recovery 
Programme (NERP) 
Never implemented until abandoned without trace 
2006 National Economic Development 
Priority Programme (NEDDP) 
-Average real GDP -4.1% (2004-2005) 
-Budget deficit peaked from 0.3% in 2003 to 24.9% of 
GDP in 2005 
-Interest rates from 500-600% 
-90% of manufacturing firms unable to cover their 
costs and increase capacity utilisation 
-Major mines closed down leaving 40,000 people on 
the streets; 3,4 million people migrated 
-60% of population living below US$1 per day 
 
2007 Zimbabwe Economic Development 
Strategy (ZEDS) 2009-2013 
-Still born and never got implemented 






Chinese-financed infrastructure projects backed by natural resources, 2001-2007 
Country  Year Project    Resource Cost-USm 
1.Congo Republic – 2001  Congo River Dam oil  280  
2.Sudan  2001 Power plant   oil  128 
3.Angola  2004 Infrastructure   oil  1,020  
4.Nigeria  2005 Gas turbine power plant oil  298 
5.Guinea*  2006 Dam project   bauxite 1,000 
6. Gabon*  2006 Belinga iron ore reserves iron  N/A 
7. Zimbabwe* 2006 Coal mines, power stations chromium N/A 
8. Ghana  2007 Bui Dam   cocoa  562
 _______________________________________________________________
______ 
Source: Reconstructed from World Bank (2007) 
• The deals for Guinea was under consideration at the time of publication. 
• The deal for Zimbabwe had not materialised at the time of publication.  
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